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Articles
Settlement Agreements and the

Supreme Court
by
MARGARET MERIWETHER CORIDRAY*

American law treats the settlement agreement as a member of
the larger family of private contracts. As a consequence, since contract actions typically belong in the realm of the state common law,1
the United States Supreme Court has had few occasions in the last
half-century to decide cases involving legal disputes over settlement
agreements. It is thus noteworthy, and deserving of careful attention,
that in 1994 the Supreme Court decided three cases-Kokkonen v.
GuardianLife Insurance Co. of America,2 DigitalEquipment Corp. v.
Desktop Direct,Inc.,3 and U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall
Partnership4 -which involved issues relating to settlement
agreements.
In light of the relative rarity of such cases in the Supreme Court,
this trilogy of decisions provides significant insight into the Court's
views about settlements and, more specifically, about the established
public policy favoring the private settlement of disputes. Prior to
these cases, the Court had strongly endorsed the principle that courts
should construe statutes, rules of court, and legal doctrines with an
emphasis on this public policy. It is thus striking, and potentially quite
* Associate Professor of Law, Capital University Law School. B.A. 1983, University of the Pacific; J.D. 1986, Boalt Hall School of Law; B.C.L. 1988, Oxford University. I
wish to thank Susan Gilles, Mark Greenberg, Steven Kautz, and Harry Litman for their
valuable suggestions. I also would like to express my thanks to Lisa DeFilippo for her
careful help with the research of this article, and to Susanna Marlowe and Jane Underwood
for their generous assistance in the library.
1. See Erie R.R v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (repudiating the notion that
there is a "federal general common law").
2. 114 S. Ct. 1673 (1994).
3. 114 S. Ct. 1992 (1994).
4. 115 S. Ct. 386 (1994).
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significant, that the Court gave very little weight and only passing attention to this policy in resolving the settlement issues presented in
these three cases.
The Court's dismissive treatment of the traditional policy favoring settlement in these decisions is puzzling, and it suggests a need for
reconsideration of the meaning and significance of the policy.
Although the Court has consistently invoked the policy, it has never
directly analyzed how the policy should be understood and how much
dispositive force it should have when weighed against countervailing
institutional interests. As the lower courts confront new issues that
involve settlement agreements in future cases, it is essential that they
have a clear sense of the proper place of this long-standing policy in
judicial decision-making.
This Article will begin with a review of the three Supreme Court
cases in order to explain the novel issues that the Court resolved. In
doing so, it will also discuss the Court's treatment of the policy favoring settlement in these decisions. The Article will then attempt to
consider more thoroughly both the significance of the policy and its
place in the legal analysis of issues involving settlements. In particular, the Article will suggest that because the policy serves important
institutional interests, it is more than a narrow concern that focuses on
the interests of the specific parties in settling their case; instead, it is a
substantial public policy that should receive much more careful attention than the Court gave it in these decisions. Finally, the Article will
address two additional issues concerning settlement agreements that
have troubled the lower courts. These issues will be examined in
terms of both the Court's new decisions and the treatment of the policy favoring settlement that has been presented, in an effort to suggest
how other legal issues involving settlements should be approached in
future cases.
I. The Supreme Court Decisions
A. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America
The first case in the trilogy was Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America.5 Kokkonen presented the issue of whether a
federal court has the power to enforce a settlement agreement in a
case that the court had already dismissed.
The issue arises because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only such power as is conferred upon them under
5. 114 S. Ct. 1673 (1994).
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the Constitution and by statute. 6 Thus, in order for a federal district
court to act in a case, it must be authorized to exercise jurisdiction
over the cause of action. With respect to the dispute that originally
brings the parties to court, this jurisdiction may exist because, for instance, the dispute involves a question "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States," 7 or because there is
diversity of citizenship between the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.8 Only if jurisdiction exists may the district
court proceed to resolve the parties' dispute.
In most cases, the parties enter into an agreement settling their
dispute before the court issues a final judgment in the case. 9 Under
accepted legal principles, this settlement agreement is regarded as a
contract between the parties, enforceable on the same terms as any
other private contract.' 0 When a case is settled, the court generally
closes the case by issuing an order of dismissal, often with prejudice."
In doing so, the district court formally relinquishes jurisdiction over
the original cause of action. Moreover, unless the court expressly retains jurisdiction over the settlement agreement, the court is not engaged in active supervision of the parties' performance of their
settlement agreement.
6. Id at 1675. See also Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 135 (1992) (noting that
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure cannot extend or restrict a federal court's jurisdiction); Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986) (stating that
federal courts only have the power authorized in Article III and congressional statutes).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994). On January 17, 1997, the amount in controversy minimum of § 1332 was scheduled to increase to $75,000. Federal Courts Improvement Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, 110 Stat. 3847 (1996).
9. See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and
Regulation of Settlements, 46 STm. L. REv. 1339, 1339-40 (1994) (citing a study by Herbert
M. Kritzer finding that over two-thirds of cases are settled before any authoritative decision in the case is made by a judge or other decisionmaker); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For
and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33
UCLA L. REv. 485,502 (1985) (stating that over 90% of all cases, both civil and criminal,
are settled).
10. See e.g., United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 238 (1975);
Village of Kaktovik v. Watt, 689 F.2d 222, 231 (D.C. Cir. 1982). See also Larry Kramer,
Consent Decrees and the Rights of Third Parties,87 MIcH. L. REv. 321, 325 (1988) ("The
agreement by which the plaintiff agrees to dismiss his lawsuit is an ordinary contract, and it
can be enforced, modified or set aside as such.").
11. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(ii) provides for dismissal of an action
"by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action,"
and allows the parties to stipulate that the dismissal is to be with prejudice. Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) allows an action to be dismissed "upon order of the court and
upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper."
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In some cases, though, the parties quarrel over one another's
compliance with the terms of the settlement agreement. In that situation, the complaining party may, of course, file an action for breach of
contract in state court, which is normally the appropriate forum for
the adjudication of contract disputes. 12 The complaining party, however, may prefer to return directly to the original court-a federal district court-to seek enforcement of the terms of the settlement
agreement. 13 The question presented in Kokkonen was whether the
district court has the power to act in response to such a request. In
other words, the issue was whether the district court has jurisdiction to
enforce a settlement agreement in a case that the court had dismissed
earlier, where the court does not have an independent basis for jurisdiction over the contract claim and did not expressly retain jurisdiction when it dismissed the case.
When this situation arose in Kokkonen, the district court concluded that it had the "'inherent power"' to enforce the settlement
agreement. 14 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed,' 5 holding that a
12. It is widely agreed that a settlement agreement is a contract, and that its enforceability is governed by contract law. See, e.g., American Sec. Vanlines, Inc. v. Gallagher, 782
F.2d 1056, 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Kaktovik, 689 F.2d at 230; Florida Educ. Ass'n, Inc. v.
Atkinson, 481 F.2d 662, 663 (5th Cir. 1973). State courts, which are courts of general jurisdiction, are proper forums for resolution of contract claims in any case in which they arise.
Langley v. Jackson State Univ., 14 F.3d 1070, 1074 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 61
(1994); McCall-Bey v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1178, 1186 (7th Cir. 1985).
13. The ability to return directly to the original court for enforcement of the settlement agreement may be advantageous to the complaining party for several reasons. First,
it may be quicker, enabling that party to get immediate help from the court, rather than
having to endure the slow process of starting a separate contract action in another court.
Second, it may be significantly less expensive to move for enforcement in the original court
than to begin a new lawsuit. Third, the party seeking enforcement may prefer to remain in
the federal forum. Cf Kramer, supra note 10, at 325-26 (describing the enforcement advantages of consent decrees). These advantages are even more pronounced if the judge
helped to mediate the settlement agreement, because the judge will already be familiar
with the terms of the agreement and may be angry at the party who failed to abide by its
terms.
14. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. CV-F-90-325-REC, slip op. at 6
(E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 1992), aff'd, 993 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1993), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 1673 (1994).
The case involved various state law claims arising out of an agency relationship; it was filed
in federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. While the case was in trial, but before
the trial had concluded, the parties reached an agreement settling all claims and counterclaims. At the parties' request, the district court then dismissed the case with prejudice,
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(ii). In its order of dismissal, the
district court neither expressly retained jurisdiction over the settlement agreement nor incorporated any of the terms of the settlement agreement into the dismissal order itself.
Several weeks later, Guardian Life returned to the district court, complaining that Kokkonen had breached the settlement agreement and asking the district court to enforce the
provisions of the agreement. The district court, however, had no independent basis for

November 1996] SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND THE SUPREME COURT 13

district court has jurisdiction under its "'inherent supervisory power'"
to enforce the terms of a settlement agreement after dismissal of a
case. 16 In reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals emphasized
that the "'authority of a trial court to enter a judgment enforcing a
settlement agreement has as its foundation the policy favoring the amicable adjustment of disputes and the concomitant avoidance of costly
17
and time consuming litigation."'
jurisdiction over the settlement agreement: although the parties remained diverse, the
amount in controversy following the settlement of the case was no longer sufficiently high
to meet the requirement for diversity jurisdiction. Kokkonen, 114 S. Ct. at 1675. It should
be noted that a federal court also generally has no independent basis for jurisdiction over a
settlement agreement in cases where jurisdiction was originally based on the existence of a
federal question. Id at 1677; McCall-Bey v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1178, 1187 (7th Cir. 1985).
Cf.Board of Trustees of the Hotel and Restaurant Employees Local 25 v. The Madison
Hotel, Inc., 97 F.3d 1479, 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that the district court had an
independent basis for jurisdiction over an agreement settling ERISA claims because "enforcement of the settlement agreement itself will require adjudication of substantive federal law issues over which federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction under the ERISA
statute"). See generally infra note 178.
15. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 993 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1993), rev'd,
114 S.Ct. 1673 (1994).
16. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 92-16628, slip op. at A-5 (9th Cir.
Apr. 27, 1993) (quoting Widkinson v. FBI, 922 F.2d 555, 557 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled in
part by Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 114 S.Ct. 1673 (1994)).
Several other courts had reached similar conclusions, reasoning in part that jurisdiction attached because the settlement agreement grew out of the original federal suit, and
could not "be separated from the purpose of its birth." Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531
F.2d 1368, 1371 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976). See also Joy Mfg. Co. v. National Mine Serv. Co., 810 F.2d 1127, 1128-29 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (upholding the district
court's implicit adoption of the Aro rationale); Hamilton v. School Comm. of Boston, 725
F. Supp. 641, 647-48 (D. Mass. 1989) (holding that the federal interests in settlement procedure and in Title VII compliance, -along with considerations of judicial economy, justify
federal jurisdiction over a breach of settlement claim).
It should be noted, however, that the Sixth Circuit's holding in Aro was more limited
than the Ninth Circuit's holding in Kokkonen. In Aro, the Sixth Circuit held that, after the
district court has vacated its prior dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b), the court has "the inherent power.., to enforce the agreement which had settled
the dispute pending before it." 531 F.2d at 1371. In Hinsdale v. Farmers Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 823 F.2d 993, 996 (6th Cir. 1987), the Sixth Circuit clarified that, under Aro, in
order for the court to enforce the settlement contract, it must first reinstate the case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which permits the court to relieve a party
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding in enumerated circumstances. The Ninth Circuit went further in Kokkonen, holding that the court has the inherent power to enforce a
settlement contract even without reopening the case under Rule 60(b). The effect of the
Supreme Court's holding in Kokkonen on the Aro/Hinsdaleline of cases is discussed, infra,
in'Part HI.A at notes 184-209 and accompanying text.
17. Kokkonen, slip op. at A-2 - A-3 (quoting Dacanay v. Mendoza, 573 F.2d 1075,
1078 (9th Cir. 1978)). See also Aro, 531 F.2d at 1372 ("Public policy strongly favors settlement of disputes without litigation."); Hamilton, 725 F. Supp. at 643 ("Jurisdiction is necessary to implement the federal policy in favor of settlements.").
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The Supreme Court, however, granted review of Kokkonen and
reversed the Ninth Circuit's assertion of inherent power. 18 The Court
unanimously held that a federal court does not have the power to enforce a settlement agreement after it has dismissed a case, unless the
court had retained jurisdiction over the settlement agreement in its
dismissal order or otherwise has some independent basis for
jurisdiction. 19
The opinion, written by Justice Antonin Scalia, is noteworthy for
the narrowness of its holding on a federal court's ability to obtain jurisdiction over a settlement agreement after it had unconditionally dismissed a case. The opinion, however, is also noteworthy for the
breadth of its dicta on a federal court's ability to retain jurisdiction
over a settlement agreement when it dismisses a case.
The opinion began with a forceful admonition that the federal
courts, as courts of limited jurisdiction, must have a proper jurisdictional basis before they may undertake to act at all.20 The Court then
proceeded to consider whether the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction
could serve as a basis for jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement. 21 In doing so, the Court explained that it has recognized ancilA number of courts had taken the opposite view, however, holding that a district court
does not have jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement unless the agreement had
been incorporated into an order of the court or there exists some independent ground of
federal jurisdiction. See Langley v. Jackson State Univ., 14 F.3d 1070, 1074 (5th Cir.), cert
denied, 115 S.Ct. 61 (1994); Sawka v. Healtheast, Inc., 989 F.2d 138, 141 (3rd Cir. 1993);
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Libby, McNeill & Libby, Inc., 895 F.2d 421, 423 (7th Cir.
1990); Adduono v. World Hockey Ass'n, 824 F.2d 617, 620 (8th Cir. 1987); McCall-Bey v.
Franzen, 777 F.2d 1178, 1186-87 (7th Cir. 1985); Fairfax Countywide Citizens Ass'n v.
County of Fairfax, 571 F.2d 1299, 1302-06 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1047 (1978).
These courts rejected any notion of derivative jurisdiction, on the basis that derivative
jurisdiction "should be grounded on something more substantial than a mere showing that
the settlement agreement would not have been entered into but for the existence of litigation pending in federal court." Fairfax Countywide Citizens Ass'n, 571 F.2d at 1305. See
also McCall-Bey, 777 F.2d at 1186-88 (If a judge "undertakes to adjudicate issues of contract law that he does not have statutory authority to adjudicate ... he cannot use Rule
60(b) to fill the vacuum.").
18. Kokkonen, 114 S.Ct. at 1677.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1675.
21. The doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction "recognizes federal courts' jurisdiction over
some matters (otherwise beyond their competence) that are incidental to other matters
properly before them." Id.at 1676. It is interesting that the Court did not reference the
relatively new "supplemental jurisdiction" statute, which is generally understood to have
codified the doctrines of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1996);
13B CHARLEs A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3567.2, at 37
(2d ed. Supp. 1994) ("In 1990 Congress codified the doctrines of 'pendent jurisdiction' and
"ancillary jurisdiction' under a new name, 'supplemental jurisdiction."').
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lary jurisdiction "for two separate, though sometimes related,
purposes: (1) to permit disposition by a single court of claims that are,
in varying respects and degrees, factually interdependent... ; and (2)
to enable a court to function successfully, that is, to manage its pro22
ceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees."
The Court quickly dismissed the first justification for ancillary jurisdiction on the ground that the facts underlying the parties' original
dispute will be separate and distinct from those underlying a claim for
breach of the settlement agreement. 23 The Court then disposed of the
second justification, stating: "the power asked for here is quite remote
from what courts require in order to perform their functions.... [T]he
only order here was that the suit be dismissed, a disposition that is in
no way flouted or imperiled by the alleged breach of the settlement
agreement. ' 24 The Court therefore concluded that ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the agreement did not exist.
An interesting aspect of the Court's opinion is the narrowness of
its focus in its discussion of the second justification for ancillary jurisdiction, regarding a court's ability to manage its proceedings, vindicate
its authority, and effectuate its decrees. In its discussion, the Court
looked only at whether the order of dismissal itself was jeopardized by
breach of the settlement agreement, and found that it was not. The
Court did not consider whether it is necessary for the federal courts to
have jurisdiction in order to facilitate the federal courts' long-standing
policy favoring settlement. Indeed, although both parties had discussed this point in their briefs,25 and some of the lower courts had
explicitly relied on it,26 the Court's opinion did not even discuss the
potential impact of its holding on the policy favoring settlement.
Refusing to allow the federal courts to exercise jurisdiction to enforce settlement agreements, however, may disserve the policy favoring settlement because it makes settlement a less attractive method of
resolving a dispute. Settlement is made less attractive because litigants will expect that if some problem arises with performance of the
settlement agreement, they will have to file a new lawsuit in a different court alleging breach of the settlement contract, rather than re22. Kokkonen, 114 S. Ct. at 1676.
23. Id. at 1677.
24. 1d.
25. Respondent's Brief at 29-30, Kokkonen (No. 93-263); Petitioner's Brief at 39-41,
Kokkonen (No. 93-263).
26. See, eg., Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368, 1372 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976); Hamilton v. School Comm. of Boston, 725 F. Supp. 641, 643 (D.
Mass. 1989).
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turning directly to the federal court for help. 27 Litigants may thus be
less inclined to settle, because they will anticipate that enforcement of
their rights under the terms of a settlement agreement will be costly
and cumbersome. To the extent that this disinclination to settle leads
to fewer settlements, significant savings to both the litigants and to the
judicial system will be lost.
While consideration of the possible effect on the policy favoring
settlement ultimately may not have been sufficient to persuade the
Court that ancillary jurisdiction to enforce settlement agreements is
proper, it is significant that the Court apparently gave it no weight
whatsoever in its analysis of the ancillary jurisdiction issue. It is possible that the Court felt that this concern was unrelated to the jurisdictional issue, but the second justification for the ancillary jurisdiction
doctrine seems sufficiently open-ended to permit, and perhaps even to
suggest, its consideration. 28 By ignoring the point, therefore, the
Court indicated that any concern about a possible negative impact on
the policy favoring settlement is insufficiently important to influence
its resolution of the ancillary jurisdiction question. At the very least,
the Court seems to have indicated its view that the policy favoring
settlement cannot compete with the federal courts' institutional interest in maintaining strict limits on the discretionary doctrines that permit them to expand their jurisdiction-an interest that reflects
concerns about preserving the resources of the federal courts and
maintaining a good relationship with the state courts.
The Kokkonen opinion thus rests upon a strict interpretation of
the jurisdictional requirement. The Court insisted that the federal
courts act only with a solid basis for jurisdiction, and it interpreted the
doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction narrowly so as not to permit a federal
court to reach out and enforce a settlement agreement in a case that
the court had unconditionally dismissed.
At the same time, however, the opinion is noteworthy for its apparently inconsistent dicta, which presents a generous view of the federal courts' power to retain jurisdiction over private settlement
agreements and then to exercise that jurisdiction to enforce the terms
27. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons why parties
might prefer to return to the federal court for enforcement of their settlement agreement).
28. Under the second rationale for ancillary jurisdiction, the Court has found, for example, that federal courts have the power to compel payment of attorney's fees as a sanction for misconduct, Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43-55 (1991), and the power
to appoint counsel to prosecute the violation of a court's order, Young v. United States ex

rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 793-801 (1987). See generally 13 WRIGrr
supra note 21, § 3523, at 82-118 (discussing the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction).

ET A..,
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of those agreements. After deciding that the federal courts do not
have ancillary jurisdiction over a settlement agreement after an unconditional dismissal, the Court took pains to explain that ancillary
jurisdiction to enforce the agreement does exist where the court has
expressly retained jurisdiction over the settlement agreement in its order of dismissal. 29 The Court reasoned that "if the parties' obligation
to comply with the terms of the settlement agreement ha[s] been
made part of the order of dismissal.., then a breach of the agreement
would be a violation of the order. '30 The Court then emphasized that
the federal courts have broad power to retain jurisdiction over a settlement agreement:
When the dismissal is pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(a)(2), which specifies that the action "shall not be dismissed at
the plaintiff's instance save upon order of the court and upon such
terms and conditions as the court deems proper," the parties' compliance with the terms of the settlement contract (or the court's "retention of jurisdiction" over the settlement contract) may, in the
court's discretion, be one of the terms set forth in the order. Even
when, as occurred here, the dismissal is pursuant to Rule
41(a)(1)(ii) (which does not by its terms empower a district court to
attach conditions to the parties' stipulation of dismissal) we think
the court is authorized to embody the settlement contract in its dismissal order (or, what has the same effect, retain jurisdiction over
the settlement contract) if the parties agree. 31
In according the federal courts such wide latitude to retain jurisdiction in the order granting dismissal, the Supreme Court undercut
the principle behind its actual holding in the case. In one remarkable
paragraph, the Court brushed off the argument for jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement after an unconditional dismissal, emphasizing that the claim for enforcement is a contract dispute, which is
unrelated to the facts of the original dispute and "is in no way essential to the conduct of federal-court business."'32 The Court even
hinted that a federal statute providing for jurisdiction to enforce a set33
tlement agreement in this situation might be unconstitutional.
In the wake of this strong rejection of jurisdiction, however, the
Court immediately proceeded to make clear that, by simply adding a
29. Kokkonen, 114 S. Ct. at 1677.
30. Id.
31. Id
32. i&
33. The Court stated: "The short of the matter is this: The suit involves a claim for
breach of a contract, part of the consideration for which was dismissal of an earlier federal
suit. No federal statute makes that connection (if it constitutionally could) the basis for
federal-court jurisdiction over the contract dispute." Ild.
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provision to the order of dismissal "retaining jurisdiction" over the
settlement agreement, the federal court would indeed preserve jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. Moreover, the Court suggested no
substantive, policy-based limits on this power to retain jurisdiction
over claims arising out of the settlement agreement despite the fact
that the content of such claims would be functionally indistinguishable
from those arising out of settlement agreements in cases that were
unconditionally dismissed.3 4 Indeed, the only limit that the Supreme
Court placed on the district court's authority to retain jurisdiction
over a settlement agreement was that when the dismissal is pursuant
35
to Rule 41(a)(1)(ii), the parties must agree to the retention.
Although this limitation could potentially come into play in most
cases because settlement-based dismissals are typically effected
through Rule 41(a)(1)(ii), it does not act as a substantive limit on the
court's authority. 36 In other words, this limit does not cabin the
court's power to retain jurisdiction over settlement agreements in
cases where the parties do agree. The Court did not suggest any limits
on the district court's discretion in that situation; the Court provided
no guidance on when it is or is not appropriate, as a matter of policy,
34. It is hard to see why it is inappropriate for a district court to enforce a settlement
agreement in a case that it had unconditionally dismissed, while at the same time it is
appropriate for a district court to enforce that same settlement agreement in a case where
it had included a provision "retaining jurisdiction" in the order of dismissal. Any concerns
about federalism or the competence of the federal courts seem equally valid in both
situations.
35. Kokkonen, 114 S. Ct. at 1677. The Court even interpreted Rule 41(a)(1)(ii) to
authorize a court to retain jurisdiction over the settlement agreement in its dismissal order,
despite the fact that the terms of the rule do not authorize a district court to attach conditions to the dismissal. Id. But see Hinsdale v. Farmers Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 823 F.2d
993, 995 n.1 (6th Cir. 1987) ("where a lawsuit is dismissed by stipulation pursuant to Rule
41(a)(1)(ii), the district court may not condition dismissal upon performance of or retain
jurisdiction to enforce terms of a settlement agreement"); 9 WIGWr ET A .. , supra note 21,
§ 2366, at 302 ("The district court has no power to impose terms and conditions if a plaintiff properly dismisses by notice under Rule 41(a)(1). Nor may the plaintiff seek a conditional dismissal under that portion of the rule.").
36. Most settlements result in dismissals under Rule 41(a)(1)(ii), which allows parties
to dismiss a case "by filing a stipulation of dismissal." Dismissals pursuant to Rule
41(a)(2), -which expressly allows the court to impose terms and conditions on the dismissal,
rarely follow settlements; that provision is designed to enable the court to protect the defendant when the plaintiff seeks dismissal after the case is underway. See McCall-Bey v.
Franzen, 777 F.2d 1178, 1183-84 (7th Cir. 1985).
The Court's limitation-that the parties must agree-is mandated by the terms of
Rule 41(a)(1)(ii). Fulfillment of that requirement, however, cannot in itself serve as a basis
for jurisdiction. The Court has long held that the parties in the case cannot by agreement
confer subject matter jurisdiction on the federal courts. See American Fire & Casualty Co.
v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17-18 & n.17 (1951).
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for a federal court to maintain jurisdiction over the parties' settlement
agreement.3 7
In Kokkonen, the Court thus sent somewhat contradictory
messages: if the district court did not have the foresight to retain jurisdiction over the settlement agreement in its order of dismissal, then it
has no power to enforce the agreement later. On the other hand, if
the district court anticipates that it might want to participate in enforcing the agreement, it can effectively preserve its ability to do so by
including a provision retaining jurisdiction over the settlement agreement, or embodying the settlement agreement itself, in the order of
38
dismissal.
In addition, Kokkonen leaves open another possibility for the
federal courts. In its opinion, the Court explicitly left open the question of whether a federal court may, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), reopen an unconditionally dismissed case because the
settlement agreement that produced the dismissal has subsequently
been breached. 39 Embedded within that question is another which
has divided the circuit courts of appeals: whether a federal court may
reopen a dismissed case based on breach of the settlement agreement
40
and then proceed to enforce the settlement agreement.
37. Although in Kokkonen the Court did not suggest any substantive limitations on
the district courts' authority to retain jurisdiction over settlement agreements, the requiremerits set forth in Local 93, International Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478
U.S. 501 (1986), would presumably apply. In that case, the Supreme Court held that a
court may not approve a consent decree unless the decree: (1) serves to resolve a dispute
within the court's subject matter jurisdiction; (2) comes within the general scope of the
case, as defined by the pleadings; and (3) furthers the objectives of the law. Id- at 525.
38. It is worth noting that the Ninth Circuit has recently held that even if the district
court explicitly retained jurisdiction over the settlement agreement, it has the authority to
terminate that jurisdiction and refuse to enforce the settlement agreement. Arata v. NuSkin Int'l, Inc., 96 F.3d 1265, 1268-69 (9th Cir. 1996). The court reasoned that because the
district court's initial retention of jurisidiction is a discretionary act, the district court also
has discretion to terminate its continuing jurisdiction. lI&
39. Kokkonen, 114 S. Ct. at 1675. An analysis of this issue is provided, infra, in Part
III.A.
40. Compare McCall-Bey v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1178 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that the
court does not have jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement even after reopening
the case under Rule 60(b)(6)) andFairfax Countywide Citizens Ass'n v. County of Fairfax,
571 F.2d 1299 (4th Cir.) (holding that the court has the power to reopen the case under
Rule 60(b)(6), but does not thereby have jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement),
cert denied, 439 U.S. 1047 (1978) with Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368 (6th
Cir.) (holding that the court has the power to enforce the settlement agreement after it has
reopened the case under Rule 60(b)(6)), cerL denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976) and Joy Mfg. Co.
v. National Mine Serv. Co., 810 F.2d 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (same). An analysis of this issue
is also provided, infra, in Part JI.A.
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B. DigitalEquipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct,Inc.

The issue presented in Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc.,41 the second in the trilogy of cases, was whether a party has
a right to appeal immediately a district court's decision to reopen a
case, when the case previously had been dismissed on the basis of a
settlement agreement between the parties.
When parties settle a case, their settlement agreement typically
provides the parties with a right not to stand trial on the matter resolved in the agreement. 42 When a district court vacates a dismissal
that was predicated on a settlement and reopens the case, the court
overrides that bargained-for right. If a party disagrees with the district court's decision to reopen the case, then the party would prefer to
appeal the ruling immediately, rather than having to wait until after it
has endured the very trial on the merits that it had specifically sought
to avoid by assenting to the settlement agreement. The question
whether the party has a right of immediate appeal in this situation
turns on the proper application of the "collateral order" doctrine of
the final judgment rule. 43
The final judgment rule, which is contained in section 1291 of the
Judicial Code, provides for the right to appeal only from "final decisions of the district courts." 44 The purpose of the statute is to promote
the efficient administration of justice by preventing piecemeal litigation.45 A decision is final when it "ends the litigation on the merits
46
and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment."'
When a district court vacates an earlier dismissal and reopens the
case, its decision is not a final decision within the terms of the statute;
indeed, rather than ending the litigation on the merits, the order
serves to restart the litigation.
In construing the final judgment rule, however, the courts have
extended it to include a "narrow class of decisions that do not termi41. 114 S. Ct. 1992 (1994).
42. The Supreme Court recognized this point in DigitalEquipment: "it would be the
rare settlement agreement that could not be construed to include (at least an implicit)
freedom-from-trial 'aspect. . . ."' Id.at 2000.

43. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
44. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994).
45. DigitalEquipment, 114 S. Ct. at 1996. See generally Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.

v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981) (describing the efficiency arguments supporting the
final judgment rule); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940) (same); Michael
E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts, 58 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 1165, 1168 (1990) (same).
46. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).
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nate the litigation, but must, in the interest of 'achieving a healthy
legal system,' ... nonetheless be treated as final." 47 This extension of

the final judgment rule, known as the collateral order doctrine, has
been tightly confined to those decisions "that are conclusive, that resolve important questions completely separate from the merits, and
that would render such important questions effectively unreviewable
'48
on appeal from final judgment in the underlying action.
The circuit courts of appeals had divided over the question of
whether a district court's order vacating a dismissal-thereby rescinding the parties' settlement agreement and reopening the casefalls within the collateral order doctrine. 49 In analyzing this question,
the courts of appeals had found that such orders were conclusive and
completely separable from the merits, thus meeting two of the requirements of the collateral order test.50 Further, the courts had generally agreed that the essence of the right to avoid trial could not be
vindicated effectively after the trial had occurred, thus meeting the
"effectively unreviewable" requirement.5 1 But the courts had parted
company over whether the asserted right was sufficiently important to
merit immediate appeal.52

47. DigitalEquipment, 114 S.Ct. at 1995 (quoting Cobbledick, 309 U.S. at 326).
48. DigitalEquipment, 114 S. Ct. at 1995-96. See also Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,
437 U.S. 463, 468-69 (1978) (discussing the requirements of the collateral order doctrine);
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) (same).
49. Compare Forbus v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 958 F.2d 1036, 1039-40 (11th Cir.) (permitting immediate appeal), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 955 (1992) and Grillet v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 927 F.2d 217,219-20 (5th Cir. 1991) (same) and Janneh v. GAF Corp., 887 F.2d 432,
434-36 (2d Cir. 1989) (same), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 865 (1990) with Desktop Direct, Inc. v.
Digital Equip. Corp., 993 F.2d 755, 757-60 (10th Cir. 1993) (refusing immediate appeal),
affd, 114 S.Ct. 1992 (1994). Cf.Transtech Indus., Inc. v. A & Z Septic Clean, 5 F.3d 51,
56-58 (3rd Cir. 1993) (refusing immediate appeal of district court's order rejecting defendants' claim that a settlement between defendants and a third party gave defendants a right
not to be sued by the plaintiff), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 2692 (1994).
50. See DigitalEquipment, 993 F.2d at 757; Forbus, 958 F.2d at 1039-40; Grillet, 927
F.2d at 219; Janneh, 887 F.2d at 434. Cf.Transtech, 5 F.3d at 57 (noting that it had "substantial doubts" about whether a reinstatement order is completely separable from the
merits).
51. See DigitalEquipment, 993 F.2d at 758; Forbus,958 F.2d at 1040; Grillet, 927 F.2d
at 220; Janneh, 887 F.2d at 436. But cf.Transtech, 5 F.3d at 57 (finding it "quite clear that
the settlor-defendants' contentions can be raised on direct appeal after final judgment").
52. In Janneh, the leading case permitting immediate appeal, the Second Circuit discussed the importance of the right in conjunction with the second requirement-separability. 887 F.2d at 434-35. In Digital Equipment, both the Tenth Circuit and the Supreme
Court discussed the importance of this right in conjunction with the third requirementwhether the order is effectively unreviewable. 993 F.2d at 757-58; 114 S.Ct. at 2001.
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The leading case in the courts of appeals was Janneh v. GAF
Corp.53 In Janneh, the Second Circuit viewed the bargained-for right
to avoid trial as inextricably linked to the policy favoring the private
settlement of disputes:
That right implicates our nation's strong judicial and public policies
favoring out-of-court settlement. Litigants, courts, and Congress
view settlement as a positive force, indispensable to judicial administration. Foregoing [sic] formal courtroom procedures, including
discovery, trial, briefs and arguments, brings substantial benefits to
the parties. The costs of litigation are reduced and crowded dockets
are relieved. 54
The court thus considered this privately negotiated right to avoid trial
to be important from two perspectives. First, from an institutional
point of view, allowing immediate appeal would provide an opportunity to decrease the burden on the judicial system by allowing the
courts of appeals to weed out cases that had in fact been effectively
settled. 55 Second, from the parties' point of view, denying immediate
appeal would deprive them of the "vital" rights that they had negotiated in their settlement agreement. 56 The Second Circuit thus held
that protection of the bargained-for right not to stand trial is sufficiently important to accord a right of immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine. 57
Until the Tenth Circuit's decision in DigitalEquipment, the Second Circuit's reasoning in Janneh had generally been decisive in the

53. 887 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1989), cert denied, 498 U.S. 865 (1990).
54. 1d. at 435.
55. Id. at 433. Indeed, the Second Circuit began its opinion by asking: "Should a
court system awash in backlog delay furtler the disposition of a case where there is convincing proof that a settlement has been reached?" Id.
56. Id. at 435.
57. Id. at 435-36. The Second Circuit also looked for guidance to the Supreme
Court's decision in Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79 (1981). In Carson,which
involved a Title VII class action suit, the Court had held that a district court's order refusing to approve a settlement agreement that provides for injunctive relief is immediately
appealable under another exception to the final judgment rule-the exception for interlocutory orders that refuse injunctions. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1994). In reaching that conclusion, the Supreme Court reasoned that such an order would create a "serious, perhaps
irreparable, consequence," because it would effectively force the parties to proceed to trial,
and thus would deprive the parties of "the opportunity to compromise their claim and to
obtain the injunctive benefits of the settlement agreement they negotiated." Carson, 450
U.S. at 84, 89. In Janneh, of course, the Second Circuit was interpreting a different exception to the final judgment rule. But in Carson, the Supreme Court had emphasized the
need to protect private settlement agreements through according a right of immediate appeal, and the Second Circuit relied on that emphasis.
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other circuit courts of appeals that faced the issue.58 But the Tenth
Circuit disagreed, concluding that a claimed right to avoid trial based
on a private settlement agreement was insufficiently compelling to
meet the importance requirement of the collateral order doctrine.5 9
The court thus refused to allow the appeal.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Digital Equipment to
resolve the issue.60 A unanimous Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit,
holding that an order denying effect to a settlement agreement is not
immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. 61 In doing so, the Supreme Court was willing to assume that two of the requirements of the collateral order test-conclusiveness and
separability-were met.62 The Court instead focused on the require58. The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits explicitly adopted Janneh's reasoning. Forbus,
958 F.2d at 1039; Grillet, 927 F.2d at 219-20. It appears that there were several unpublished
opinions to the contrary, though they did not cite Janneh. See Broussard v. Violet, No. 8956207, 1991 WL 113804, at *3 (9th Cir. June 21, 1991); Helmac Products Corp. v. Roth
Plastics Corp., No. 90-1890, 1990 WL 205103, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 1990); Reeves v.
Digital Equip. Co., No. 90-3063, 1990 WL 41885, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 11, 1990); Henry v.
United McGill Corp., No. 87-3687, 1987 WL 38181, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 14, 1987). In addition, after the Tenth Circuit's decision in Digital Equipment, the Third Circuit rejected
Janneh'sreasoning in Transtech Indus., Inc. v. A & Z Septic Clean, 5 F.3d 51, 57 (3rd Cir.
1993), cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 2692 (1994).
59. Desktop Direct, Inc. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 993 F.2d 755, 760 (10th Cir. 1993),
affd, 114 S. Ct. 1992 (1994). In that case, Desktop Direct, Inc. sued Digital Equipment
Corp., alleging that Digital Equipment had unlawfully used the "Desktop Direct" name.
The parties settled prior to trial, and pursuant to the settlement agreement, Desktop Direct
filed a notice of dismissal in the district court. Several months later, however, Desktop
Direct moved to vacate the dismissal and rescind the settlement agreement on the ground
that Digital Equipment had engaged in misrepresentation during settlement negotiations.
The district court granted the motion. Desktop Direct, Inc. v. Digital Equipment Corp.,
No. 92-C-178G, slip op. at 1 (D. Utah Mar. 15, 1993), appeal dismissed, 993 F.2d 755, 760
(10th Cir. 1993), aff'd, 114 S. Ct. 1992 (1994). Although the district court did not specify
the statutory authority for its order, it presumably relied on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Digital Equipment's appeal of this order led to the Tenth Circuit's decision.
60. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 379 (1993).
61. Id. at 1994. The Court was careful to note, however, that while its decision foreclosed appeal as of right under the collateral order doctrine, a party could still seek review
of the district court's order under the discretionary appeal provision contained in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b) (1994) (permitting discretionary interlocutory appeal from district court orders
that "involve a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion"). Id at 2003-04.
Also, it is worth noting that the Court's holding will affect parties that seek to have
their case reopened, based on breach of their settlement agreement, pursuant to Rule
60(b)(6). If a party is successful in having a case reopened on that basis, the other party
will not be entitled to immediate review of the court's decision. The issue of whether a
federal court may reopen a dismissed case based on breach of the settlement agreement
that produced the dismissal is discussed, infira, in Part III.A.
62. Digital Equipment, 114 S. Ct. at 1996.
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ment that an important issue would be effectively unreviewable on
appeal from a final judgment, and it concluded that a privately negotiated right to avoid trial "does not rise to the level of importance
needed for recognition under § 1291."63
Justice David Souter's discussion of the importance requirement
provides insight into the Supreme Court's attitude toward settlement
agreements and the public policy favoring settlement. Analysis of this
requirement called upon the Court to weigh the importance of rights
embodied in a settlement agreement against the importance of institutional interests of the courts, and in particular, the interest in orderly
judicial administration and efficiency.
In balancing these rights and interests, the Supreme Court placed
little value on the rights that private parties have negotiated and embodied in their private settlements. Indeed, the Court seemed almost
to belittle such rights:
Including a provision in a private contract.., is barely a prima facie
indication that the right secured is "important" to the benefited
party (contracts being replete with boflerplate), let alone that its
value exceeds that of other rights not embodied in agreements (e.g.,
the right to be free from a second suit based on a claim that has
already been litigated), or that it qualifies as "important" in Cohen's
sense, as being weightier than the societal interests advanced by the
ordinary operation of final judgment principles. 64
This discussion of privately negotiated rights is all the more striking given the privately negotiated right at issue-the right to avoid the
expense, delay, and risk of trial. The Court seemed to equate the importance of that right with the importance of rights that are contained
in the boilerplate of a contract. But surely a provision in a settlement
contract that provides for the right to avoid trial is of the utmost importance to the settling parties. In its opinion, the Court sought to
minimize this right by separating it from the right in the settlement
contract that limits exposure to liability.65 These rights, however, are
closely intertwined: when parties settle, they not only want to fix a
sum certain to eliminate the possibility of a larger (or smaller) award
after trial, they also want to eliminate the expense and delay of trial,
with all of the attendant debilitating effects of the lingering uncer63. Id. at 2001.
64. Id. at 2001-02 (referring to Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541,
546 (1949)).
65. In the opinion, Justice Souter stated: "Judged within the four corners of the settlement agreement, avoiding trial probably pales in comparison with the benefit of limiting
exposure to liability (an interest that is fully vindicable on appeal from final judgment)."
DigitalEquipment, 114 S. Ct. at 2003.
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tainty. It is this combination of rights that is the driving motivation
behind almost any settlement that the parties reach, and thus the provision in their contract which secures this objective is the centerpiece
of the settlement agreement.
By characterizing the parties' privately negotiated right to avoid
trial as potentially unimportant even to the parties, however, the
Court had no trouble finding that such a right was insufficiently important to outweigh the judiciary's interest in efficient administration.6 6 Indeed the Court viewed such a contractual right as "far
removed" from rights "more deeply rooted in public policy" that warrant immediate appeal. 67
However, the particular contractual right at issue does implicate
an established public policy: the public policy favoring the private settlement of disputes. The Court's discussion of the impact that its decision would have on that public policy is also of considerable interest.
The petitioner in Digital Equipment had argued that failure to
provide an immediate appeal of orders abrogating a party's bargained-for right to avoid trial would undermine the policy favoring
settlement. 68 The Court acknowledged the argument, but refused to
find that "settlement-agreement 'immunities"' advance "the public
66. The Court's tone with respect to the importance of settlement agreements in Digital Equipment is a marked departure from its tone in Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450
U.S. 79 (1981). In Carson, the Court recognized that settlement agreements might "be
predicated on an express or implied condition that the parties would, by their agreement,
be able to avoid the costs and uncertainties of litigation." Id at 87. But rather than finding
the loss of that privately negotiated right insufficiently important to justify immediate appeal, as it did in DigitalEquipment, the Court in Carson saw the loss as a "serious, perhaps
irreparable, consequence." Id To be sure, the issue in Carson was different: the Court
was considering a different exception to the final judgment rule and it saw the order in that
case-which refused to approve the parties' settlement agreement and thus forced them to
go to trial-as jeopardizing the parties' ability to enter into a settlement agreement at all.
Id In addition, the Court may have been more comfortable in giving a broad interpretation to the exception at issue in Carson,because it was a statutory exception to the final
judgment rule (not a judge-made exception as in Digital Equipment), and the Court may
have been especially concerned that the collateral order doctrine remained limited, so that
it did not "swallow the general rule." Digital Equipment, 114 S. Ct. at 1996. But even so,
the Court's concern in Carson about the parties' ability to realize the benefits of their
settlement agreement seems inconsistent with the deprecating treatment that the Court
gave to settlement-based rights in DigitalEquipment. The Court did not cite Carsonin its
opinion in DigitalEquipment, and thus did not discuss the apparent inconsistency between
these two cases.
67. Digital Equipment, 114 S.Ct. at 2004. For rights warranting immediate appeal,
see, for example, Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (right of qualified immunity for
government officials); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977) (right against double
jeopardy).
68. Petitioner's Brief at 22-28, Digital Equipment (No. 93-405).
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policy favoring voluntary resolution of disputes. '69 The Court reasoned that it "defies common sense to maintain that parties' readiness
to settle will be significantly dampened (or the corresponding public
interest impaired) by a rule that a district court's decision to let allegedly barred litigation go forward may be challenged as a matter of
70
right only on appeal from a judgment" after trial on the merits.
The interesting aspect of the Court's observation is not its conclusion (which seems correct as far as it goes), but rather its focus, which
was narrowly directed at the impact that the rule would have on a
party's incentives to enter into a settlement ex ante. The Court did not
consider the impact that its rule might have on a party's incentives to
try to upset an existing settlement agreement or, more broadly, the
impact that its rule might have on the achievement of the goals that
form the basis for the policy favoring settlement.
Once a settlement has been reached, a party will be inclined to
seek to have the agreement set aside where it later determines that it
has made a bad bargain or where it believes that its chances of prevailing in the underlying case have significantly improved. One party or
the other is likely to arrive at this view in many cases that have been
settled. It is in this situation that the effects of the ruling in Digital
Equipment are most likely to be felt. If a district court agrees to reopen a case, and if immediate appeal of its decision to do so is not
available, then the parties face going to trial, unless they enter into a
new settlement agreement. The party who opposed reinstatement of
the case has already evidenced a significant interest in avoiding the
expense and delay of trial, by entering into the settlement in the first
place and then by seeking to preserve it. Because that party will likely
maintain that same interest, it will again be under substantial pressure
to settle once the case has been reinstated. Any such settlement almost certainly will be on less favorable terms because the initiating
party was willing to reinstate the case rather than abide by the previous settlement. Whenever a subsequent settlement is reached, moreover, the initiating party will have avoided any appellate review of the
trial court's decision to reopen the case. Under the ruling in Digital
Equipment, therefore, the initiating party will have an excellent opportunity to achieve a more advantageous result by seeking to set
aside an existing settlement agreement. This effect upon the parties'
incentives increases the likelihood that one party or the other will try
69. DigitalEquipment, 114 S. Ct. at 2002.
70. Id. at 2002-03.
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to upset an existing settlement and reopen the case, with detrimental
consequences for the policy favoring settlement.
More fundamentally, however, the Court did not discuss the
broader effect that its rule might have on the achievement of the goals
that form the foundation of the policy favoring settlement. Public policy favors the private settlement of disputes because settlements ease
the burden on courts, conserve judicial resources, reduce the expense
and risk of litigation for parties, and promote more lasting conciliation.71 When a district court overrides a settlement agreement and
reopens a case, these important benefits to the judicial system are necessarily lost in that case unless or until another settlement is
reached. 72 If the appellate court determines only after full trial on the
merits that the district court's decision to reopen was wrong, then the
benefits were lost without good reason.
In the end, these detrimental effects upon the goals underlying
the policy favoring settlement might not have outweighed the interests
in orderly judicial administration and efficiency that the final judgment rule promotes. But it is significant that the Court focused almost
exclusively on those other interests and apparently did not even consider the effect on the policy favoring settlement from this more comprehensive perspective. Instead, the Court brushed aside any
concerns about the policy, and provided only a superficial analysis of
how its ruling would affect the incentives that parties have to enter
into settlements ex ante.
C. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership
The final case in this trilogy of decisions was U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership.73 Bonner Mall presented the
issue of whether an appellate court should vacate the lower court's
judgment in a case that is settled during the appellate process.
Parties settle cases not only before trial, but also after trial, when
an appeal is pending in the court of appeals or even in the Supreme
Court. A settlement during the appellate process terminates the litigation, just as a pre-trial settlement does. Normally, the case is simply
dismissed at that juncture, leaving the parties to perform their respective obligations under the privately negotiated agreement that re71. See infra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
72. Even if a subsequent settlement is reached, these important benefits will have
been lost in the interim in any case where an appellate court would have determined that
the district court's decision to reopen the case was wrong.
73. 115 S. Ct. 386 (1994).
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solved their dispute. But sometimes the parties ask the court to do
more: to vacate the subordinate court's judgment in the case. 74
Vacatur can be attractive to the losing party for related reasons.
First, if the losing party is concerned about collateral consequences,
vacatur enables the party to eliminate any res judicata or collateral
estoppel effects of the judgment. 75 Second, if the losing party is concerned about the adverse decision serving as precedent in other cases,
vacatur enables the party to undermine the decision's precedential
value. 76 In addition, when vacatur is desirable for the losing party, it
can also be attractive to the winning party, because it gives the winning party more bargaining power during settlement negotiations. If
the losing party wants vacatur, the winning party has added leverage
to demand greater concessions in return for its joining in, or at least
77
not opposing, a request for vacatur.
A request for vacatur following settlement gives rise to two issues. The first is whether the appellate court is required to vacate the
decision of the lower court on the ground that settlement of the action
mooted the case. The second is whether the appellate court should, in
its discretion and as a matter of policy, vacate the lower court's
decision.78
With respect to the first question, litigants seeking vacatur had
argued that under the doctrine of United States v. Munsingwear,Inc. ,79
the court must vacate the judgment below because settlement renders
the case moot. In Munsingwear, the Supreme Court established that
74. For a useful discussion of the mechanics of a motion to vacate following settle-

ment, see Jill E. Fisch, Rewriting History: The Propriety of EradicatingPrior Decisional
Law Through Settlement and Vacatur, 76 CORNELL L. Rnv. 589, 593-99 (1991) [hereinafter
Rewriting History].
75. Without vacatur, the prior judgment would continue to have collateral consequences, because dismissal of a case on appeal does not automatically affect the prior judgment, which continues to have full force and effect. See 1B JAMES WM. MooRE ET AL.,
MooRE's

FEDERAL

PRAC'cE

0.416[5]-[6] (2d ed. 1988).

76. See In re Memorial Hosp. of Iowa County, Inc., 862 F.2d 1299, 1302 (7th Cir.
1988) (explaining that vacatur "clouds and diminishes the significance of the holding").
77. See Judith Resnik, Whose Judgment? Vacating Judgments, Preferencesfor Settlement, and the Role of Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. Rv.
1471, 1490-91 (1994) [hereinafter Role of Adjudication].
78. There is no question that the federal courts are authorized to vacate decisions,
even if they are not required to do so. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b), 59(e); Lake Coal Co. v.
Roberts & Schaefer Co., 474 U.S. 120 (1985) (per curiam) (granting vacatur after a case
became moot due to settlement); Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Yanakas, 11 F.3d
381, 384 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that "the appellate court has discretion to order such a
vacatur [following settlement], and this discretion has been exercised both by the Supreme
Court ... and by this Court").

79. 340 U.S. 36 (1950).
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when a case becomes moot while an appeal is pending, the judgment
below must be vacated if review was "prevented through happenstance." 80 Most of the circuit courts of appeals, however, had refused
to apply the Munsingwear doctrine to cases in which mootness was
produced by settlement.81 Reasoning that Munsingwear only requires
vacatur when mootness occurred due to circumstances beyond the
parties' control, these courts had refused to vacate when the case had
become moot due to a voluntary decision to forgo an appeal by settling the litigation.82
The more troubling issue for the circuit courts of appeals had
been the second issue-whether the courts should, as a matter of policy, vacate the lower court's decision upon the parties' request. On
this issue the courts were deeply divided.8 3 The courts that favored
granting the parties' request for vacatur had focused on the importance of promoting settlements, concluding that concerns about the
finality of judgments should yield to the policy favoring settlement of
80. Id. at 39-40. In Munsingwear,the United States sought injunctive relief and damages for alleged violations of a price control regulation. The claim was first litigated with
respect to injunctive relief only. The district court held that Munsingwear's pricing complied with the regulation, and dismissed the case. While the United States' appeal was
pending, the commodity involved was deregulated. Munsingwear then moved to dismiss
the appeal based on mootness, the United States acquiesced in the motion, and the court
of appeals dismissed the case as moot. Later, the United States sought damages in a separate action. Munsingwear successfully moved to dismiss the damages action on grounds of
res judicata. The United States argued that it was unfair to accord res judicata effect to a
judgment that it had been unable to appeal because of mootness. The Supreme Court
ultimately held that, because the United States had failed to request vacatur of the district
court's decision, it had "slept on its rights" and could not complain. Id.at 37-41.
81. See, ag., Oklahoma Radio Assocs. v. FDIC, 3 F.3d 1436, 1437-39 (10th Cir. 1993);
Clarendon Ltd. v. Nu-West Indus., Inc., 936 F.2d 127, 130 (3rd Cir. 1991); In re United
States, 927 F.2d 626, 627-28 (D.C. Cir. 1991); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Seafrst Corp.,
891 F.2d 762, 765-67 (9th Cir. 1989); In re Memorial Hosp. of Iowa County, Inc., 862 F.2d
1299,1301-02 (7th Cir. 1988); Nestle Co. v. Chester's Market, Inc., 756 F.2d 280, 281-82 (2d
Cir. 1985). But see U.S. Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 971 F.2d 728, 731 (Fed. Cir.
1992), cerL granted,507 U.S. 907 (1993), and cert dismissed, 510 U.S. 907 (1993); Kennedy
v. Block, 784 F.2d 1220, 1223 (4th Cir. 1986).
82. See, e.g., Oklahoma Radio, 3 F.3d at 1437-39; Clarendon, 936 F.2d at 130; In re
United States, 927 F.2d at 627-28; National Union, 891 F.2d at 765-67; MemorialHosp., 862
F.2d at 1301-02; Nestle, 756 F.2d at 281-82.
83. Compare Clarendon, 936 F.2d at 130 (denying vacatur), In re United States, 927
F.2d at 627-28 (same), Clipper v. Takoma Park, 898 F.2d 18, 19 (4th Cir. 1989) (same), and
Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1301-02 (same) with Federal Data Corp. v. SMS Data Products Group, Inc., 819 F.2d 277, 279-80 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (granting vacatur) and Nestle, 756
F.2d at 281-82 (same). See also Oklahoma Radio, 3 F.3d at 1437-39 (employing a case-bycase balancing approach); National Union, 891 F.2d at 765-67 (same); Westmoreland v.
National Transp. Safety Bd., 833 F.2d 1461-63 (11th Cir. 1987) (same).
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disputes. 84 In addition, these courts had stressed the effect of refusing
vacatur on the parties, finding "no justification to force these defendants, who wish only to settle the present litigation, to act as unwilling
private attorneys general and to bear the various costs and risks of
litigation."8 5
Other courts, however, had concluded that parties' requests for
vacatur should be denied. Although the courts taking this view
agreed that settlement of disputes is valuable, 6 they emphasized that
a judicial opinion is a formal act of the government that has significant
social value as precedent.8 7 These courts were loath to allow that precedent, which was created at public expense and might benefit future
88
litigants, to be "a bargaining chip in the process of settlement."
In its first attempt to resolve this conflict of authority in the
courts of appeals, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Izumi
Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp.8 9 Izumi grew
out of a lawsuit between Windmere Corporation and U.S. Philips Corporation, alleging unfair competition and antitrust claims. Windmere
and Philips settled the suit while the case was on appeal to the Federal
Circuit. Pursuant to the settlement, Windmere and Philips requested
that the court of appeals vacate the district court's judgment. Izumi,
which had a significant interest in preserving the collateral benefits of
the district court's judgment, then sought to intervene to oppose the

84. In Nestle, for instance, the Second Circuit stated: "[H]ere we are faced with a
settlement that will bring pending litigation to an end. Because the policies favoring finality of judgments are intended to conserve judicial and private resources, the denial of the
motion for vacatur is counterproductive because it will lead to more rather than less litigation." 756 F.2d at 282. See also FederalData Corp., 819 F.2d at 279-80 (agreeing with the
reasoning of the Nestle court); 13A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21, § 3533.10, at 432 ("All
of the policies that make voluntary settlement so important a means of concluding litigation apply.").
85. Nestle, 756 F.2d at 284. See also FederalData Corp., 819 F.2d at 280 (observing
that it would be unjust to require parties who had settled their dispute to continue to
litigate).
86. In Memorial Hospital,for instance, the Seventh Circuit stated: "It is hard to be
against settlement. Any disposition that the parties to the litigation unanimously endorse
has much to be said for it-it produces peace for the parties and frees scarce judicial time
to attend to litigants who need it." 862 F.2d at 1302. See also Clarendon, 936 F.2d at 129
("[w]e share the view that voluntary settlements should be encouraged.").
87. See Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1302; In re United States, 927 F.2d at 628.
88. Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1302. See also In re United States, 927 F.2d at 628
(quoting Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d at 1302); Clarendon, 936 F2d at 129 (same).
89. 507 U.S. 907 (1993).
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vacatur motion.90 The court of appeals denied Izumi's motion to intervene and granted the motion for vacatur.91
Izumi then sought certiorari, and the Supreme Court agreed to
review the issue of whether the courts of appeals should grant motions
to vacate district court decisions when cases are settled during the appellate process. After briefing, however, the Supreme Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted, finding that
Izumi had not properly preserved the intervention issue and therefore
had no standing to seek review of the question presented. 92 In his
dissent, however, Justice Stevens made clear his view of the merits:
"Judicial precedents are presumptively correct and valuable to the
legal community as a whole. They are not merely the property of private litigants and should stand unless a court concludes that the public
interest would be served by vacatur." 93
Several months later, the Supreme Court found another opportunity to address the issue. The Court had granted certiorari in U.S.
Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnershipto consider an issue
of bankruptcy law.94 Prior to oral argument, however, the parties
agreed to a consensual plan of reorganization, which effectively settled the case. The parties thus asked the Court to dismiss the case as
moot. In addition, Bancorp, which had lost below, asked the Court to
vacate the decision of the court of appeals. Bonner Mall opposed that
request, and the Court called for briefing on the vacatur issue. 95
In a unanimous decision, the Court held that mootness resulting
from settlement does not justify vacatur of a judgment. 96 In reaching
that conclusion, the Court considered both aspects of the vacatur
90. The parties had asked the Federal Circuit to vacate the district court's judgment
holding against Philips on unfair competition and antitrust claims. Izumi sought to use that
judgment as collateral estoppel in another action that Izumi was involved in against Philips.
For a helpful discussion of the complicated litigation among these various parties, see Resnik, Role of Adjudication, supra note 77, at 1480-81.
91. U.S. Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 971 F.2d 728, 730-32 (Fed. Cir. 1992), cert.
granted, sub nom. Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp. 507 U.S.
907 (1993), and cert dismissed, 510 U.S. 27 (1993).

92.

Izumi Seirnitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 510 U.S. 27, 28-34

(1993).
93. Id. at 40 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
94. 114 S.Ct. 681 (1994).
95. 114 S.Ct. 1367 (1994).
96. BonnerMall, 115 S.Ct. at 393. The Court expressly affirmed that it had the power
to consider the vacatur question, even though the case had become moot: "'If a judgment
has become moot [while awaiting review], this Court may not consider its merits, but may
make such disposition of the whole case as justice may require."' Id. at 390 (quoting Walling v. Reuter Co., 321 U.S. 671, 677 (1944) (brackets in original)).
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question: whether a court is required to vacate the decision below
under Munsingwear; and if not, whether a court should do so as a
matter of policy.
In analyzing these issues, the Court began by clarifying the scope
and meaning of Munsingwear. The Court explained that Munsingwear is grounded in the "equitable tradition of vacatur." 97 Under that
equitable tradition, a judgment is not allowed to stand when the party
adversely affected is prevented from seeking review by circumstance
or the unilateral action of the prevailing party.98 The Court made
clear, however, that this equitable tradition extends only to situations
in which the losing party does not cause the mootness. Emphasizing
this limitation, the Court concluded: "Where mootness results from
settlement, however, the losing party has voluntarily forfeited his legal
remedy by the ordinary processes of appeal or certiorari, thereby surrendering his claim to the equitable remedy of vacatur." 99
Having disposed of the Munsingwear issue, the Court then considered the question of vacatur from a policy standpoint. This discussion, authored by Justice Scalia, is of particular interest. Although the
facts of the case presented only the question of whether the Court
should grant vacatur following settlement even over the objection of
one party, the Court also addressed the broader question of whether it
should grant vacatur when all parties have agreed to request it and the
parties' settlement agreement so provides. To reach this broader
question, the Court had to weigh the institutional interests in orderly
administration, finality, and precedent against the opposing interests
in facilitating settlement of cases. 100
In its discussion, the Court first affirmed that there is a significant
public interest in judicial precedents, which are "'valuable to the legal
community as a whole." ' 10 1 The Court then addressed the institutional interest in the orderly administration of the judicial system.
Noting that the "primary route" for parties to seek relief from the
consequences of a judgment is appeal as of right and certiorari, the
Court expressed its concern that allowing vacatur to serve as "a refined form of collateral attack on the judgment would disturb ... the
orderly operation of the federal judicial system."' 02 The Court
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
U.S. 27,
102.

IdL, 115 S. Ct. at 391.
Id. at 391-92.
Id. at 392.
Id. at 392-93.
Id. (quoting Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 510
40 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
Id.
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stressed that the public interest is best served when the demands of
orderly procedure are honored.
Working from that premise, the Court then considered whether
vacatur could be justified on systemic grounds. First, the Court considered whether it was appropriate to vacate on the ground that holdings in decisions on which certiorari is granted are of questionable
quality. Although acknowledging that such cases are reversed more
often than affirmed, the Court found it inappropriate to grant vacatur
"on the basis of assumptions about the merits."' 03 The Court then
considered whether it would be useful to vacate a moot decision, leaving the legal question unresolved, and thus generating continued examination of the issue among the lower courts. The Court rejected
outthat ground, opining that the value of additional debate is far
1°4
questions.
legal
of
resolution
clear
of
benefits
the
by
weighed
Finally, the Court considered the effect of granting vacatur on the
public policy favoring the settlement of disputes. 05 Looking at the
question from a systemic point of view, the Court observed that while
granting vacatur might facilitate settlement at the appellate level, it
might deter settlement at an earlier stage (where the savings in judicial resources will generally be much greater). 10 6 This delay in reaching settlement could occur because parties might be more willing to
risk an adverse judgment if they knew that they would have an opportunity to dissolve it later through settlement and vacatur. This
counterargument had been noted in one of the lower court opinions
rejecting vacatur,10 7 and it significantly complicates the analysis of the
overall effect this practice would have on promoting or impeding the
policy favoring settlement.
One would expect, therefore, that the Court would have undertaken a more detailed analysis of the likely magnitude of these countervailing factors in an effort to gauge the potential consequences on
the policy favoring settlement. Surprisingly, however, the Court did
103. Id. at 392-93.
104. Id. at 393.
105. In the briefs, the parties argued back and forth about whether granting vacatur
would facilitate settlement. Petitioner's Brief at 30, Bonner Mall (No. 93-714); Respondent's Brief at 37-41, Bonner Mall (No. 93-714). The courts of appeals had explicitly relied
on the policy favoring settlement in holding that vacatur should be granted when it will
Nestle Co. v. Chester's Market, Inc., 756 F.2d 280, 282 (2d
facilitate settlement. See, e.g.,
Cir. 1985).
106. Bonner Mall, 115 S.Ct. at 393.
107. See In re Memorial Hosp. of Iowa County, Inc., 862 F.2d 1299, 1302 (7th Cir.
1988) (pointing out that "our approach encourages" earlier settlement "before the district
court renders a decision").
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no more than briefly speculate about these possible effects. Indeed,
without undertaking any careful or serious examination of the issue,
the Court almost immediately threw up its hands, complaining that it
was "quite impossible" to assess the effect of vacatur on the "frequency or systemic value of settlement."' 0 8 In reaching that conclusion, the Court apparently made no attempt to determine empirically,
or even as a matter of common sense, whether routine refusal of vacatur would undermine or promote the policy favoring the private settlement of disputes. 10 9
Another interesting aspect of the decision in Bonner Mall is the
extent to which the Court admittedly reached beyond the question
presented in the case in order to advise the courts of appeals on how
to handle requests for vacatur of district court opinions." 0 On this
point, the Court noted that a Second Circuit opinion had held that
vacatur should be granted more freely of district court decisions than
appellate decisions because district court decisions are subject to review as of right."' Rejecting this distinction, the Court emphasized
that the policy considerations weighing against vacatur were equally
strong in both instances. The Court thus instructed the federal courts
of appeals not to grant vacatur on grounds of mootness due to settlement, except in "exceptional circumstances.""12 Moreover, the Court
made clear that these exceptional circumstances must have their basis
in something more than the interest in facilitating settlement: "It
should be clear from our discussion.., that those exceptional circum108. Bonner Mall, 115 S. Ct. at 393.
109. The Court's analysis of this issue was perhaps hampered by the fact that the Court
was reaching beyond the issue presented on the facts of the case-whether vacatur should
be granted following settlement even though one party objects-to decide the broader
issue of whether vacatur should be granted when the parties' settlement provides for it, or
is even contingent upon it.
A more extensive attempt to engage in an analysis of the effect of refusing vacatur on
the policy favoring settlement is provided in part III.B, on the closely related issue of
whether a court should accede to the parties' request for vacatur of coercive contempt
sanctions. See infra notes 227-31 and accompanying text.
110. Acknowledging that "the case before us involves only a motion to vacate, by reason of settlement, the judgment of a court of appeals," the Court nonetheless felt it "appropriate to discuss the relevance of our holding to motions at the court of appeals level."
Bonner Mall, 115 S.Ct. at 393. The Court thus pressed on, despite the fact that Bancorp,
which was seeking vacatur, specifically limited its argument to one in favor of discretionary
vacatur in cases that become moot due to settlement while pending before the Supreme
Court. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 2-3, Bonner Mall (No. 93-714).
111. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Yanakas, 11 F.3d 381, 384-85 (2d Cir. 1993).
112. Bonner Mall, 115 S.Ct. at 393.
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stances do not include the mere fact that the settlement agreement
provides for vacatur .... -"113
H. The Public Policy Favoring Settlement
In each of these cases-Kokkonen, DigitalEquipment, and Bonner Mall-the Supreme Court was called upon to resolve issues involving settlement agreements. In view of the infrequency with which
the Court addresses such issues, this trilogy of decisions provides important insight into the Court's current thinking about settlements. It
also provides significant new guidance for the lower courts as they
inevitably will confront an array of related but distinct issues involving
settlements in future cases.
By far the most notable feature of these decisions is the Court's
unexpectedly cursory treatment of the public policy favoring the private settlement of disputes in its analysis of the issues presented. To
begin with, the Court consistently declined to give dispositive weight
to the policy in deciding these cases. The Court's neglect of the policy
is all the more surprising in view of the fact that leading decisions in
the lower courts had relied heavily on the policy in considering and
114
resolving each of these issues.
113. ld. Interestingly, some of the lower courts have continued to apply an ad hoc,
balancing approach to the issue of whether a court should vacate a decision in response to
the parties' settlement-based request. See, e.g., Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1370-71 (9th
Cir. 1995) (reaffirming that a court should "decide whether to vacate its judgment in light
of 'the consequences and attendant hardships of dismissal or refusal to dismiss' and 'the
competing values of finality of judgment and right to relitigation of unreviewed disputes"')
(quoting Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. v. Western Conference of Teamsters, 686 F.2d 720, 722
(9th Cir. 1982)); Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 882 F. Supp. 1355, 135657 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (stating that the court must "balance the ends of justice on the one
hand, e.g., by honoring a settlement, and the public interest in the finality of judgments on
the other"). But see Bailey v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Va., 878 F. Supp. 54, 55-56 (E.D.
Va. 1995) (requiring that the parties demonstrate exceptional circumstances beyond the
fact that the settlement agreement provides for vacatur); EFS Mktg., Inc. v. Russ Berrie &
Co., No. 91 CIV. 5515 (JFK), 1995 WL 77924, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 1995) (same); Hiller
v. Hiller, 179 B.R. 253, 257-62 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1994) (same).
114. See e.g., Janneh v. GAF Corp., 887 F.2d 432, 435 (2d Cir. 1989) (relying on the
policy favoring settlement in granting immediate review of a district court's decision to
reopen a case that had been dismissed on the basis of a settlement agreement), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 865 (1990); Nestle Co., v. Chester's Market, Inc., 756 F.2d 280, 282 (2d Cir. 1985)
(relying on the policy favoring settlement in holding that courts should grant vacatur of
district court opinions when both parties agree to vacate the decision in a settlement agreement); Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368, 1371 (6th Cir.) (relying on the policy
favoring settlement in holding that a federal court has inherent power to enforce a settlement agreement), cert denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976).
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Even more striking, however, is the fact that the Court did not
simply decline to rely on the policy favoring settlement in deciding
these cases, but in the end the Court gave it little or no weight in
analyzing the issues presented.115 Although it never offered any explanation of the reasons why the policy was receiving such short shrift
in these cases, it appears from the Court's limited analysis that the
Court recognized the broader institutional interests reflected in the
policy, and was aware that these might reach beyond the narrow,
party-focused concerns. Nonetheless, the Court's treatment of the
policy in these cases suggests that the Court failed to recognize the
true significance of those interests and their proper place in analysis of
settlement issues. Before turning to a more thorough discussion of
the role that the policy should play in the resolution of such issues,
however, it is important first to restate the foundations of the policy
favoring settlement.
A. The Foundations of the Policy Favoring Settlement

The public policy favoring the private settlement of disputes has
generally received enthusiastic support from the commentators and
the courts. Settlement is favored in the law for a variety of reasons.
From a practical standpoint, settlements significantly ease the burden
on courts. When parties resolve their dispute through settlement
rather than full litigation, the growing pressure on court dockets is
relieved. Settlement thus enables courts to conserve scarce judicial
Settlement is, as a
resources and to reduce their considerable backlog.
'1 6
""
administration.
judicial
to
result, "indispensable
Settlement also decreases the expense and risk of litigation for
parties. Litigation of a dispute imposes significant costs on the parties.
115. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's treatment of
the policy in Kokkonen); notes 68-72 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's treatment of the policy in Digital Equipment); and notes 105-109 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's treatment of the policy in Bonner Mall).
116. Janneh, 887 F.2d at 435. See also In re Smith, 926 F.2d 1027, 1029 (11th Cir. 1991)
("Settlement is generally favored because it conserves scarce judicial resources."); American Sec. Vanlines, Inc. v. Gallagher, 782 F.2d 1056, 1060 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
("[S]ettlements produce a substantial savings in judicial resources and thus aid in control"); Stephen Bundy, The Policy in Favor of Settlement in an
ling backlog in the ourts ....

Adversary System, 44 HAsTrNGs L.J. 1, 48 (1992) ("The dramatic increase in both the
number of cases filed per federal judge and in the percentage of those cases that impose
severe time demands on judges may suggest that individual settlements could substantially
reduce the federal backlog.") (footnotes omitted). But see Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YA.E L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (opining that settlement should be treated "as a
highly problematic technique for streamlining dockets. . . .[A]lthough dockets are
trimmed, justice may not be done.").
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Some of these costs are obvious, such as fees for attorneys and expert
witnesses, court costs, and the cost of the party's own time spent in
responding to discovery requests and otherwise preparing for the litigation. Other costs are more subtle, but nonetheless can be quite substantial. These costs include the debilitating effects of uncertainty and
exposure to risk that exist while a dispute remains unresolved, and the
toll taken by the aggravation and distress that so often plague a party
7
as a lawsuit grinds its way through the court system."
Settlement may also be preferable to litigation when viewed from
the very different perspective of the potential substantive content of
the resolution of a dispute. In particular, settlement can result in a
more satisfying resolution than would occur in litigation, because in
negotiation the parties are free to consider the entire spectrum of relevant facts and principles, whether or not they are formally cognizable
in law. Further, the parties have the flexibility to craft more creative-and potentially more responsive-solutions to their problems,
because they are neither limited to the traditional legal remedies nor
"binary, win/lose results. 11 8 In addition, the parties' participation in
working out a resolution of their dispute may produce greater commitment to and cooperation in seeing through that resolution. 1 9
Recognizing the benefits that flow from the private settlement of
disputes, the Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed the policy favoring settlement. Indeed, at the turn of the century, the Court declared
117. See; e.g., Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 10 (1985) (noting that "settlements rather
than litigation will serve the interests of plaintiffs as well as defendants"); American Sec.
Vanlines, Inc., 782 F2d at 1060 n.5 (stating that "settlements promote efficient use of private resources by reducing litigation and related costs"); Aro, 531 F.2d at 1372 ("By [settlement] agreements are the burdens of trial spared to the parties, to other litigants waiting
their turn before over-burdened courts, and to the citizens whose taxes support the latter."); Autera v. Robinson, 419 F.2d 1197, 1199 & n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (noting that settlement is in "high judicial favor," because "the parties avoid the expense and delay
incidental to litigation of the issues").
118. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 9, at 487. See also id,at 504-05 (discussing the ways
in which settlement offers a "substantive justice that may be more responsive to the parties' needs than adjudication"); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Private OrderingThrough Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARv. L. REv. 637, 653-60 (1976)
(discussing the advantages of private dispute negotiation over adjudication). But see Galanter & Cahill, supra note 9, at 1354, 1359, 1388 (challenging the argument that settlement
is more responsive to parties' needs, and stating that "[S]ettlement is not intrinsically good
or bad, any more than adjudication is good or bad. Settlements do not share any generic
traits that commend us to avoid them per se or to promote them."); Bundy, supranote 116,
at 37-58 (critically assessing the claim that settlement better serves the public interest).
119. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 9, at 502 ("If the parties make their own agreement they are more likely to abide by it, and it will have greater legitimacy than a solution
imposed from without.").
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that "settlements of matters in litigation, or in dispute, without recourse to litigation, are generally favored."' 20 Shortly thereafter, the
Court reiterated that "[c]ompromises of disputed claims are favored
1 21
by the courts."'
Over the ensuing decades, the lower courts embraced these
strong signals about the policy favoring settlement and applied them
in a variety of cases.' 22 Citing this early Supreme Court authority, for
instance, the District of Columbia Circuit stated:
Voluntary settlement of civil controversies is in high judicial favor.
Judges and lawyers alike strive assiduously to promote amicable adjustments of matters in dispute, as for the most wholesome of reasons they certainly should. When the effort is successful, the parties
avoid the expense and delay incidental to litigation of the issues; the
court is spared the burdens of a trial, and the preparation and proceedings that must forerun it. By the same token, there is everygained by encouraging methodology that facilitates
thing to be 123
compromise.

Many other cases also emphasized the strength and importance of the
policy,124 and this approach had been supported in the leading treatises as well.' 25
The Supreme Court's own endorsement of the policy also had
remained consistent in its more recent decisions. In 1985, for instance,
the Court gave an expansive construction to Federal Rule of Civil
120. St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. v. Montana Mining Co., 171 U.S. 650, 656 (1898).
121. Williams v. First Nat'l Bank, 216 U.S. 582, 595 (1910).
122. For recent lower court cases quoting the language in Williams, see, for example,
American Sec. Vanlines, Inc., 782 F.2d at 1060; Cia Anon Venezolana de Navegacion v.
Harris, 374 F.2d 33, 35 (5th Cir. 1967); Austin v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections, 876 F.
Supp. 1437, 1455 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Reed v. United States, 717 F. Supp. 1511, 1515 (S.D. Fla.
1988), affd, 891 F.2d 878 (11th Cir. 1990).
123. Autera v. Robinson, 419 F.2d 1197, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (footnotes omitted).
124. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 73 (2d Cir. 1982) ("There are
weighty justifications, such as the reduction of litigation and related expenses, for the general policy favoring the settlement of litigation."), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983); Miller
v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 426, 428 (5th Cir. 1977) ("Settlement agreements
are 'highly favored in the law and will be upheld whenever possible because they are a
means of amicably resolving doubts and preventing lawsuits."') (quoting Pearson v. Ecological Science Corp., 522 F.2d 171, 176 (5th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 425 U.S. 912 (1976));
Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp. v. Spiller & Spiller, Inc., 489 F.2d 974, 978 (7th Cir. 1973)
("It cannot be gainsaid that in general settlements are judicially encouraged and favored as
a matter of sound public policy."); Miller v. Pyrites, Co., 71 F.2d 804,810 (4th Cir.) ("Compromises of disputed claims are favored by the court .... "), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 604
(1934).
125. See, eg., E. ALLAN FARNSwORTH, CoNRAcrs § 2.12, at 71 (2d ed. 1990) ("The
law favors settlement by the parties of disputed claims in the interests of alleviating discord
and promoting certainty."); 6 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1268, at 72-73
(1962) ("Compromises are known to be favored by the law.").
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Procedure 68, which allows for offers of judgment, in order to further
the rule's purpose of encouraging settlements. 126 In its analysis of
Rule 68, the Court reiterated the policy favoring settlement, emphasizing that "settlements rather than litigation will serve the interests of
plaintiffs as well as defendants."'127 The following year, the Court
again relied heavily on the policy favoring settlement in holding that,
under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, a district
court has discretion to permit a negotiated waiver of attorney's fees in
a settlement on the merits. 128 The Court stressed its concern that
prohibiting waiver of fees "would itself impede vindication of civil
rights, at least in some cases, by reducing the attractiveness of settlement."' 29 Indeed, the Court's fear that "parties to a significant
number of civil rights cases will refuse to settle if liability for attorney's fees remains open, thereby forcing more cases to trial, unnecessarily burdening the judicial system, and disserving civil rights
litigants,"' 30 led directly to the Court's conclusion that it was not necessary to construe the Fees Act to preclude waivers of attorney's
fees. 131 Following this lead, the lower courts have continued consist-

126. Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 5-10 (1985).
127. Id.at 10.
128. Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 736-38 (1986).
129. Id. at 732.
130. Id. at 736-37 (footnote omitted). The Court believed that a defendant would be
less likely to settle if its potential liability for fees, which could be quite large, remained
unresolved in the merits settlement. Id. at 734-36 & n.23. Further, the Court noted that if
a defendant lowered the amount of the settlement offer to account for the risk of attorney's fees, the plaintiff might be more likely to reject the settlement. Id. at n.23.
131. Id. at 737-38. See also United States v. Mezzanato, 115 S.Ct. 797, 804 (1995)
(recognizing that the policy favoring settlement in criminal cases is a "substantial 'public
policy' interest[ ]"); McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 114 S.Ct. 1461, 1467 (1994) (rejecting a
rule of pro tanto setoff with right of contribution against the settling defendant in admiralty
cases, "because it discourages settlement and leads to ancillary litigation"); Carson v.
American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 87-90 (1981) (allowing immediate appeal of a district
court's order refusing to approve the parties' negotiated settlement, where that settlement
contained injunctive relief); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research Inc., 401 U.S. 321,
343-44 (1971) (rejecting the common law rule that the release of one joint tortfeasor releases other tortfeasors who are not parties to the release, because the rule would frustrate
partial settlements). But cf.United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 407-08
(1975) (considering whether the potential beneficial effect on the promotion of settlement
justified continued use of the divided damages rule in admiralty cases; finding that a comparative negligence rule would likely not undermine settlement, but in any event
"[c]ongestion in the courts cannot justify a legal rule that produces unjust results in litigation simply to encourage speedy out-of-court accommodations").
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ently to articulate their support for the public policy favoring the private settlement of disputes. 132
In addition, the policy has received strong support in other legal
sources. The courts and Congress have institutionalized their approval of the policy by adopting rules that are designed to facilitate
and encourage settlements. For instance, Rule 68 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure provides for offers of judgment; the "plain purpose
of Rule 68 is to encourage settlement and avoid litigation."'1 33 Rule 16
gives federal judges authority to seek to facilitate settlement during
pretrial conferences. 34 Rule 26(f) generally requires attorneys to discuss "the possibilities for a prompt settlement or resolution of the
case" at an initial planning meeting. 35 And Federal Rule of Evidence
408 protects offers to settle and settlement discussions from admission
into evidence at trial in order to promote "the public policy favoring
the compromise and settlement of disputes."'1 36
Support for the policy has also come to be reflected in a variety of
statutes. For example, in the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Congress encouraged federal district courts to consider and employ various mechanisms to facilitate a settlement between the parties, 37 and
the policy favoring settlement is also reflected in Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.138
This broad approval of the policy favoring settlement has strongly
influenced matters of ordinary judicial practice, especially in the trial
courts. Perhaps most important, the procedural rules and reformsnotably the emphasis on settlement in pretrial conferences, the rules
governing offers of judgment, and the expanded use of settlement
132. See, e.g., Justine Realty Co. v. American Nat'l Can Co., 976 F.2d 385,391 (8th Cir.
1992) ("Settlement agreements are generally encouraged and favored by the courts.");
Hemstreet v. Spiegel, Inc., 851 F.2d 348, 350 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("The law strongly favors
settlement of litigation, and there is a compelling public interest and policy in upholding
and enforcing settlement agreements voluntarily entered into."); MWS Wire Indus., Inc. v.
California Fine Wire Co., 797 F.2d 799, 802 (9th Cir. 1986) ("There is an 'overriding public
interest in settling and quieting litigation."') (quoting United States v. McInnes, 556 F.2d
436, 441 (9th Cir. 1977)).
133. Marek, 473 U.S. at 5.

134. FED. R. Civ. P. 16. A number of the circuit courts of appeals have also set up
programs to help facilitate settlement at the appellate level. The Second Circuit's Civil

Appeals Management Program (CAMP) is an example.
135. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(f).
136. FED. R. Evm. 408 advisory committee's note.
137.

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 471, 473.

138. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44
(1974) (noting that, in Title VII, Congress expressed a preference for voluntary settlement
of disputes).
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conferences and various other alternative dispute resolution procedures-have encouraged judges to become increasingly active in trying to broker settlements between parties. 139 Indeed, these practices
have been taken so far in many courtrooms that they have now
spawned something of a backlash in the legal literature, as a number
of scholars have begun to question the extent to which the judicial
role should be potentially distorted in single-minded pursuit of the
otherwise laudable goal of promoting settlement. 140
It is therefore clear that the dominant principle on settlement issues prior to the Supreme Court's recent trilogy of decisions had been
consistent allegiance to the advancement of the public policy favoring
the private settlement of disputes. Indeed, this point had come to be
so well established that one scholar has observed: "It is a truism that
41
the law favors a policy of settlement and compromise.'
B. Reconsideration of the Policy in the Wake of the Tilogy

Despite this impressive pedigree, the Supreme Court treated the
policy favoring settlement with indifference in this recent trilogy of
settlement cases. Although the policy favoring settlement was implicated in each of Kokkonen, DigitalEquipment, and Bonner Mall, the
Court apparently gave the policy little, if any, weight in deciding the
cases. Indeed, the Court's analysis of the issues in these cases raises
the prospect that the Court may view the policy as commendable in
139. See FED. R. Crv. P. 16, 68; 28 U.S.C. §§ 471, 473; Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary
Observations,53 U. Cm-. L. Rv. 366 (1986) (describing and evaluating summary jury trials, court-annexed arbitration, and private alternative dispute resolution). See generally
Bundy, supra note 116, at 3-4 (discussing the procedural innovations that have led to increased judicial involvement in the settlement process); Galanter & Cahill, supra note 9, at
1340 ("Over the past five decades, first state and then federal judges have embraced active
promotion of settlement as a major component of the judicial role.").
140. The discussion in the academic literature about judicial promotion of settlements
focuses not on whether settlements should be favored, but rather on the extent to which
judges should become enmeshed in brokering settlements. See, eg., Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARv.L. REv. 374, 378-380, 404 (1982) (describing and criticizing the
increasingly managerial role that judges now have); Galanter & Cahill, supra note 9, at
1342-50, 1364, 1387-91 (arguing that, "if settlements on the whole represent a gain for
courts, it does not follow that judges' spending their time promoting settlement leads to
such gains. Simply, since most cases will settle anyway, the benefits of using judges' time to
promote settlement are hard to discern"; in general, the authors contend that the "task for
policy is not promoting settlements or discouraging them, but regulating" their quality);
Bundy, supra note 116, at 58-78 (discussing the appropriate judicial role in settlement and
advocating a moderate approach); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 9, at 491-514 (discussing
the relative merits of the mandatory settlement conference).
141. Bundy, supra note 116, at 3.
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theory, but insufficiently significant in practice to compete with other
values, such as the institutional interests in maintaining strict limits on
jurisdiction, improving efficiency, following orderly procedures, and
promulgating precedent. If so, this would represent a marked departure from the Court's previous statements about the importance of the
policy favoring settlement. 142 The Court's treatment of the policy in
these decisions thus calls for reconsideration of both the meaning and
the significance of that policy.
As an initial matter, the Court's analysis in these cases exposes a
potential confusion about the proper understanding of the policy
favoring settlement. In each of these cases, the Court relied on policybased, institutional interests in deciding the issues presented: in Kokkonen, the Court stressed the need for strict limits even on some of
the discretionary aspects of the jurisdiction of the federal courts; 143 in
DigitalEquipment, the Court focused on the benefits of efficiency that
result from application of the final judgment rule;144 and in Bonner
Mall, the Court emphasized the value of maintaining orderly procedures and preserving judicial precedents. 45 Although the Court evaluated the issues presented from this essentially policy-based
perspective, it nonetheless failed to place any emphasis on the policy
favoring settlement. The Court's approach is all the more striking because in each instance, it rejected positions that many lower courts
had adopted by strongly emphasizing the policy favoring
46
settlement.
A possible explanation for this rejection is that the lower courts
may have seemed to take a simplistic view of the policy, which the
Court judged to be of little value in its analysis of these issues. Several
of the leading lower court decisions appeared to approach the policy
favoring settlement from a narrow, party-centered perspective. On
the vacatur issue, for example, the Second Circuit had stressed the
142. See supra notes 120-21, 126-31.
143. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. of Am., 114 S. Ct. 1673, 1676-77 (1994).
144. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc. 114 S. Ct. 1993, 2002 (1994).
145. U. S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 115 S. Ct. 386, 392-93
(1994).
146. See, e.g., Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368, 1372 (6th Cir.) (relying on
the policy favoring settlement in holding that a federal court has inherent power to enforce
a settlement agreement), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976); Janneh v. GAF Corp., 887 F.2d
432, 435 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 865 (1990) (relying on the policy favoring
settlement in granting immediate review of a district court's decision to reopen a case that
had been dismissed on the basis of a settlement agreement); Nestle Co. v. Chester's Market, Inc., 756 F.2d 280, 282 (2d Cir. 1985) (relying on the policy favoring settlement in
holding that courts should grant vacatur of district court opinions on request).
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particular interests of the parties before them in discussing the effects
of the policy favoring settlement:
Should we refuse to vacate the judgment, the appellees will be
forced to bear the costs and risks of further litigation, including the
non-trivial risk of a reversal on the merits.... We see no justification to force these defendants, who wish only to settle the present
litigation, to act as unwilling private attorneys general and to bear
the various costs and risks of litigation. 147

From this perspective, the policy favoring settlement might be understood simply to mean that courts should attempt to give effect to the
wishes of the particular parties in front of them in particular cases, as
a means of facilitating their efforts to achieve a settlement and helping
to effectuate the terms of their private contractual agreements.
It is understandable that courts might be tempted to adopt such a
party-centered formulation of the policy favoring settlement, given
that the policy arises from a desire to encourage parties to resolve
disputes by mutual agreements which are embodied in the form of
private contracts. Under the traditional model of the judiciary's role,
moreover, courts were often viewed as mere servants of the litigants:
their purpose was simply to assist the particular parties before them in
resolving their disputes. 14 8 Within this conception of the role of the
courts, it would be natural enough for the policy favoring settlement
to be regarded as nothing more than a formal recognition that courts
should do everything possible to facilitate the parties in settling, if the
parties so desire.
The Supreme Court appears to have been correct in rejecting this
more simplistic view of the policy favoring settlement. To begin with,
the Court clearly has moved beyond the limited, party-driven model
of litigation to a more sophisticated model which views the courts not
as passive servants of the parties, but rather as having "an indepen147. Nestle, 756 F.2d at 284. See also Federal Data Corp. v. SMS Data Prods. Group,
Inc., 819 F.2d 277, 279-80 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding the reasoning in Nestle persuasive).
148. See e.g., Fisch, Rewriting History, supra note 74, at 591 & n.11 (describing the
view that "the function of litigation is the resolution of private disputes, and no public
interest can outweigh the private interests of the litigants in resolving their dispute," and
referring to this "model of litigation, in which the individual choices of the litigants reign
supreme" as the "traditional model"); Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281, 1282-83 (1976) (describing the traditional lawsuit as
"party-initiatedand party-controlled," and also as "a vehicle for settling disputes between
private parties about private rights"); Stephen R. Barnett, Making Decisions Disappear:
Depublicationand Stipulated Reversal in the California Supreme Court, 26 Loy. L.A. L.
R:v. 1033, 1033 (1993) (noting that there are "radically opposed conceptions of the purpose of courts-the purpose of resolving disputes for the parties on the one hand, of making law for society on the other").
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dence from the parties, not only as voices of other parties' interests,
1 49 In
but as institutions expressive of and accountable to the public."'
this context, a party-centered formulation of the policy might well
have appeared irrelevant to the Court's analysis: resolution of particular disputes in accordance with the stated wishes of the parties is simply too limited a consideration to justify the subordination of any
substantial institutional interests of the courts.
More fundamentally, however, the policy favoring settlement is
not merely a case-specific concern, but instead represents a public policy in its own right, embodying goals that clearly reflect the public
interest. The policy cannot be understood as a mere admonition that
courts should facilitate parties in settling their cases as they wish.
Rather, the policy favoring settlement reflects institutional interests of
the courts-the interests in conserving judicial resources, in reducing
the pressure on court dockets, and in helping litigants to achieve a
satisfying and lasting resolution of their dispute.'50 To be sure, some
of the goals that the policy advances benefit the parties directly-most
particularly, the goals of decreasing the expense and risk of litigation
for parties and of achieving the most substantively satisfactory resolution of the dispute.15 ' But these aspects of the policy work in tandem
with those that reflect a more institutional focus, and together they
149. Resnik, Role of Adjudication,supranote 77, at 1527. See also Fiss, supra note 116,
at 1085 (arguing that the job of courts "is not to maximize the ends of private parties, nor
simply to secure the peace, but to explicate and give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitution and statutes: to interpret those values and to
bring reality into accord with them"); Jill E. Fisch, The Vanishing Precedent" Eduardo
Meets Vacatur, 70 NoRa DAME L. REV. 325, 339-40 (1994) (questioning "why courts
would accept a role purely as arbiters of private disputes"); Chayes, supra note 148, at
1288-1316 (describing and defending the public law litigation model).
The Supreme Court seems clearly to have endorsed this broader model of the role of
the courts. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971)
(approving a comprehensive, county-wide school desegregation plan); Hutto v. Finney, 437
U.S. 678 (1978) (approving a district court order that required broad-based reforms in the
Arkansas prison system). General acceptance of the broader model is also demonstrated
by the increasing willingness of courts to limit party autonomy to serve institutional concerns. Courts, for example, have forced litigants to consolidate their actions in order to
enable the courts to address related issues uniformly and efficiently. FED. R. Civ. P. 42
(providing for consolidation); 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (providing for multi-district litigation). See
also Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525
(1986) ("To be sure, a federal court is more than 'a recorder of contracts' from whom
parties can purchase injunctions; it is 'an organ of government constituted to make judicial
decisions . . ."' (quoting IBJ. Mooun ET AL., supra note 75, 0.409(5). See generally
Resnik, Role of Adjudication, supra note 77, at 1485-86 (discussing the ways in which
judges have limited party control over the course of litigation).
150. See supra notes 116, 118-19 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
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form a foundation for the policy that should be understood to benefit
not only the litigants before the court, but also to benefit the litigants
in future cases, the courts as an institution, and the public in general.
In Bonner Mall and DigitalEquipment, the Court clearly comprehended the broader, institutional purposes underlying the policy
favoring settlement. In Bonner Mall, for instance, the Court specifically advised the lower courts that they should not defer to the parties'
request for vacatur of a judgment, even when the parties' ability to
152
settle their case is contingent on whether they can obtain vacatur.
In doing so, the Court evidenced no concern about the interests of
particular parties in settling their cases: although the courts of appeals
had carefully included consideration of the interests of the parties
before them in their analysis of the vacatur issue, 53 the Supreme
Court did not even mention such interests. Rather, to the extent that
the Court addressed the policy favoring settlement, it focused on the
benefits-in the Court's words, the "judicial economies"-that the
courts as an institution enjoy as a result of settlement. 54 Similarly, in
DigitalEquipment,the Court considered the policy only from an institutional perspective. The Court did not concern itself with the wishes
of the parties before it,'1 but rather focused on the effect that its rule
would have on incentives for parties to settle in future cases.' 5 6 This
focus reflects institutional concerns: if parties are more inclined to settle in the future, then the savings to the courts will be increased,
crowded dockets will be relieved, and the queue will be shorter for
future litigants.
Although the Supreme Court recognized in these cases that the
policy favoring settlement reflects institutional interests of the courts,
the Court's treatment of the policy indicates that it misunderstood the
true significance of those interests. In other words, after correctly recognizing that the policy is not just a party-centered concern, the Court
inexplicably failed to give any real weight to the interests that the policy serves. These interests, however, are of substantial importance to
the judicial system, and moreover, they are similar in nature to the
other institutional interests that the Court relied on in resolving these

issues. The interests served by the policy thus should have received
152. Bonner Mall, 115 S. Ct. at 393.
153. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
154. Bonner Mall, 115 S. Ct. at 393.
155. Indeed, it would not have been productive for the Court to do so, as the wishes of
the parties were diametrically opposed: one wanted an immediate appeal of the reinstatement order, and the other did not.
156. DigitalEquipment, 114 S. Ct. at 2002-03.
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the same thoughtful analysis that the Court undertook with respect to
these other institutional interests.
For example, one of the underpinnings of the policy favoring settlement is that such agreements decrease the burden on courts. This
allows courts to conserve their limited resources because the ever-increasing pressure on the courts is reduced when parties resolve their
disputes through settlement rather than full litigation. 157 This aspect
of the policy favoring settlement is of great significance to the judicial
system. If every case were litigated to the limit, the courts would collapse under the weight of their dockets. In a real sense, this aspect of
the policy allows the courts to function smoothly and efficiently.
Thus, when the Court discussed the related considerations of efficiency and orderly procedures in DigitalEquipment and Bonner Mall,
it should have carefully considered any effect that its rulings might
have on this aspect of the policy favoring settlement.
More specifically, in Digital Equipment, the Court carefully emphasized that strict enforcement of the final judgment rule promotes
"efficient administration of justice in the federal courts.' u58 Efficient
administration is undoubtedly an important institutional concern: the
courts could not continue to function effectively without efficient procedures. In its analysis, however, the Court should have also considered whether greater overall efficiency might be produced by treating
the settlement-based right to avoid trial as sufficiently important t6
warrant immediate appeal, thus allowing cases which had, in fact,
been effectively settled to be removed from the judicial system before
significant resources were invested in litigating a trial on the merits.
In Bonner Mall, the Court stressed the benefits to "the orderly
operation of the federal judicial system"' 59 that flow from requiring
parties who seek relief from a judgment to take the primary route of
appeal and certiorari. The Court, however, should also have considered whether allowing parties to obtain relief from a judgment
through another route-agreed vacatur-would lead to more settlements, and thereby benefit the orderly operation of the judicial system
by helping to reduce the crush of work in the federal courts.
Another significant justification for the policy favoring settlement
is that settlement reduces the expense and risk of litigation for parties,
and it also provides them with a speedier, and potentially more satis157. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
158. Digital Equipment, 114 S. Ct. at 1996.
159. Bonner Mall, 115 S. Ct. at 392.
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fying, resolution of their dispute. 160 To the extent that parties may be
more committed to a resolution that is achieved through negotiation
rather than litigation, the pressure on the courts may be reduced because the parties may be in a better position to work out problems
cooperatively, without resorting to further litigation. This aspect of
the policy favoring settlement thus may also, to some degree, help the
courts to function smoothly and efficiently.
This aspect of the policy is important to the courts as an institution for another reason as well: a primary function of the judicial system is to resolve disputes. 161 When the courts facilitate settlement,
they help parties resolve their disputes, and further, they help them do
so in a way that is potentially less expensive, faster, and more satisfying. In essence, this aspect of the policy reflects a core purpose of the
courts. The Supreme Court thus should have considered this important institutional interest in its analysis of the cases, and particularly in
its analysis of the vacatur issue in Bonner Mall.
In Bonner Mall, the Court addressed the question of whether a
court should grant the parties' request for vacatur of a judicial opinion
when that request is contained in the parties' settlement agreement.
In discussing that question, the Court emphasized both the importance to the judicial system of maintaining orderly procedures and the
value of judicial precedent. 162 Both of these are, indisputably, important institutional interests. Maintaining orderly operations and the integrity of judicial precedents enables the courts to fulfill their disputeresolution function more effectively over time. Courts will be able to
deal with future cases more efficiently if dependable, orderly procedures are in place, and they will be able to resolve future disputes
more easily if the relevant rules have been clearly and comprehensively interpreted in previous cases. In addition, through authoritative
statements of the law in judicial precedents, courts serve the public
interest by enabling people to order their affairs in light of clearly defined legal rules. It was thus appropriate for the Court to consider
these interests, but it should not have done so to the exclusion of interests relating to the policy favoring settlement. In other words, the
Court also should have considered the value of helping parties achieve
160. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
161. Even though it seems clear that the Supreme Court has endorsed a role for the
courts that is broader than merely serving the litigants before them in resolving their particular disputes, see supra note 149 and accompanying text, helping to resolve disputes
surely remains a primary function of the judicial system.
162. Bonner Mall, 115 S. Ct. at 392.
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a resolution of their dispute through settlement in its analysis of the
propriety of granting requests for vacatur.
The point is not that the policy favoring settlement must be the
decisive consideration in any case involving a settlement agreement.
Rather, the point is that the institutional interests that the policy promotes are significant and are deserving of more careful consideration
than the Court gave them. In any given case, the interests which underlie the policy favoring settlement may not outweigh other institutional interests that point to a different resolution. But the interests
which underlie the policy are sufficiently substantial to merit significant attention in any comprehensive and convincing legal analysis.
The Court's apparent indifference to the policy in these decisions
may serve as a signal to the lower courts that the policy should be
given significantly less weight in their decision-making. 163 This may
be particularly true in those difficult cases where conflicting arguments are made about the effects of a disputed practice on the policy
favoring settlement, and the proper resolution of those opposing arguments is not immediately apparent. In these circumstances, the lower
courts may now be tempted to avoid the rigors of undertaking a thorough analysis, and instead may decide the case on other grounds, thus
essentially ignoring the possible effects of the disputed practice on the
policy favoring settlement. The courts, however, should resist this
temptation to gloss over the policy in their analysis of legal issues involving settlement agreements. For all the reasons stated above, the
courts instead should give the policy-along with the substantial interests that underlie the policy-thorough consideration in their analysis
of such issues.
As courts perform this more complete analysis of how their resolution of particular legal issues will affect the policy favoring settlement, they would be greatly aided by empirical research documenting
the effects of various judicial practices on the incentives and disincentives for parties to enter into and abide by settlement agreements.
The Supreme Court has indicated that it is willing to consider such
data, 164 and it has shown that the unavailability of such data can have
163. A number of the circuit courts of appeals had relied heavily on the policy favoring
the private settlement of disputes in making their decisions on the issues discussed in Part
I. See supra note 146 (citing cases).
164. In two recent cases, the Supreme Court has attempted to consider empirical data
on settlement-related issues. See Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips

Corp., 510 U.S. 27,40 n.11 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that there was a "natural
experiment" in the California courts of appeals with respect to the effect of vacatur on
settlement rates, because one division of that court routinely refused vacatur, while most
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important consequences for the resolution of settlement issues in
cases where arguments are made about the potential relevance of the
policy favoring settlement. 165
The amassing of statistical data on how different judicial approaches may affect the policy favoring settlement is thus an important task for legal scholarship in this area. Several techniques exist for
gathering and analyzing such information, including cross-jurisdictional comparisons where different approaches are followed, aided by
the tools of statistical and regression analysis. 166 Empirical data
would supplement or even replace the necessarily speculative reasoning that courts currently employ. Data of this nature would therefore
enhance the courts' ability to answer questions about the effect of particular practices on the policy favoring settlement, the particular
objectives that would be advanced or retarded by such practices, and
the likely magnitude and significance of such effects. This information, in turn, would better enable the courts to weigh the policy favoring settlement against other competing interests, and ultimately, to
reach more certain and persuasive decisions on legal issues involving
settlement agreements.
III. Analyzing Settlement Issues: Two Illustrations
Implicit in this discussion of the meaning and significance of the
policy favoring settlement is an analytical approach that is quite different from the Supreme Court's treatment of the policy in Kokkonen,
other divisions granted it; comparison of the rates of settlement suggested that refusal of
vacatur did not discourage settlement); United States v. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. 797,805 n.6
(1995) (chastising the defendant for failing to provide empirical support for his argument
that allowing criminal defendants to waive their right to exclusion of statements made during plea discussions would undermine the policy favoring the disposition of criminal cases
by compromise, and also noting that statistical data on the number of cases resolved
through plea bargains contradicted the defendant's predictions).
165. See, e.g., Bonner Mall, 115 S. Ct. at 393 (observing that it was "quite impossible,"
based on the limited information available, to assess the likely effect of vacatur on the
"frequency or systemic value of settlement" and thus disregarding this consideration in
resolving the issue).
166. This is, in fact, exactly the kind of empirical data that Justice Stevens cited as
persuasive evidence in his dissent in Izumi. See lzumi, 510 U.S. 27,40 n.11 (citing Barnett,
supra note 148, at 1073). This example points up the need for more comprehensive data,
however, for the study cited in this passage actually concerned the effect on settlement
rates of the practice of stipulated reversals as well as simple vacatur orders. See Barnett
supra note 148, at 1073 & n221. In addition, the size of that particular case sample was
limited, and the author of the comparison acknowledged that "other things may not have
been equal; many factors may affect an appellate court's settlement rate." Id. at 1073
n.221.
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Digital Equipment, and Bonner Mall. Under this approach, courts
would be expected to give careful and serious consideration to the

policy favoring settlement in any analysis of issues involving settlement agreements. In order to illustrate this approach, two issues that
the Court itself has recently identified, but has not yet had an oppor-

tunity to resolve, will be discussed and analyzed.
A.

Reinstatement and Enforcement of Settlement Agreements Under
Rule 60(b)(6)

In Kokkonen, the Supreme Court noted but did not address the
question of whether a federal court may reopen a case that it had
earlier dismissed, where the reopening is based on breach of the settlement agreement that prompted the dismissal. 167 The circuit courts
of appeals are divided on the issue, 168 which turns on the proper application of Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 60(b) permits a court to relieve a party from a final judgment, order, or proceeding in certain limited situations. 169 Subsection
six of the rule serves as a catchall provision, enabling the court to set
aside a judgment for "any other reason justifying relief from the oper167. Kokkonen, 114 S. Ct. at 1675. It is worth noting that this question is primarily one
for the federal courts, because it revolves around the scope of federal jurisdiction. If a
similar issue were to arise in state court, its resolution would turn on the law and procedural rules of that particular state.
168. Compare Keeling v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local Union 162, 937 F.2d
408, 410 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that repudiation of a settlement agreement justifies vacating the court's prior dismissal order), United States v. Baus, 834 F.2d 1114, 1124 (1st Cir.
1987) (same), Fairfax Countywide Citizens Ass'n v. County of Fairfax, 571 F.2d 1299, 130304 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1047 (1978), and Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co.,
531 F.2d 1368, 1371 (6th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976) with Sawka v.
Healtheast, Inc., 989 F.2d 138, 140-41 (3rd Cir. 1993) (finding that breach of a settlement
agreement "is no reason to set aside the judgment of dismissal").
169. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides, in pertinent part:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a
party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2)
newly discovered evidence -which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct
of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied,
released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should
have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment.
The rule also specifies certain time requirements: "The motion shall be made within a
reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken." Id.
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ation of the judgment."' 70 Relief under Rule 60(b)(6), however, is
only available in extraordinary circumstances, where there is otherwise a substantial danger that injustice will occur. 17 1 Most of the
courts of appeals have held that breach of the settlement agreement
that precipitated the dismissal of the case is sufficient ground for a
district court to set aside the order of dismissal under Rule 60(b)(6). 172
These courts thus allow the district courts to reopen a case for trial on
the merits if one of the parties repudiates the settlement agreement
that was the basis for dismissal. 73
The Third Circuit, however, has held that breach of a settlement
agreement does not justify relief under Rule 60(b).174 The court reasoned that these circumstances-breach of the agreement that produced the dismissal-were not sufficiently extraordinary to justify
170. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).
171. See Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 199-202 (1950); Klapprott v.
United States, 335 U.S. 601, 613-14 (1949). There is some confusion about whether the
"extraordinary circumstances" standard applies to all requests for relief under Rule
60(b)(6), or only those requests that would otherwise be time-barred under one of the
specific subsections of Rule 60(b). A number of courts have held that the extraordinary
circumstances standard always applies. See Lasky v. Continental Prods. Corp., 804 F.2d
250,255-56 (3d Cir. 1986); Industrial Assoc., Inc. v. Goff Corp., 787 F.2d 268,269 (7th Cir.
1986). Professors Wright, Miller, and Kane, however, contend:
If the reasons for seeking relief could have been considered in an earlier motion
under another subsection of the rule, then the motion will be granted only when
extraordinary circumstances are present. Otherwise, if the movant clearly demonstrates some "other reason" justifying relief outside of the earlier clauses in the
rule, then the "extraordinary circumstances" test is not invoked.
11 WiG
um- Er AL., supra note 21, § 2864, at 357. In any event, it is clear that the decision
whether to grant relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is within the discretion of the district court. Id.
at 376; Lasky, 804 F.2d at 256. For purposes of discussion, this Article will assume that the
more stringent "extraordinary circumstances" standard applies to all requests for relief
under Rule 60(b)(6).
172. See Keeling, 937 F.2d at 410; Aro, 531 F.2d at 1371; Fairfax Countywide, 571 F.2d
at 1302-03. In addition, several courts of appeals have apparently assumed that a district
court has the power to reopen a case under Rule 60(b)(6) based on breach of a settlement
agreement. See, e.g., Joy Mfg. Co. v. National Mine Serv. Co., 810 F.2d 1127, 1128-29 (Fed.
Cir. 1987); Adduono v. World Hockey Ass'n, 824 F.2d 617, 620 (8th Cir. 1987); Stipelcovich
v. Sand Dollar Marine, Inc., 805 F.2d 599, 604-05 (5th Cir. 1986); McCall-Bey v. Franzen,
777 F.2d 1178, 1186-87, 1189 (7th Cir. 1985); Chief Freight Lines Co. v. Local Union No.
886, 514 F.2d 572, 576-77 (10th Cir. 1975).
173. The district court, however, is not required to reopen a case under Rule 60(b)(6)
because the settlement agreement has been breached. See, e.g., Stipelcovich, 805 F.2d at
605 (affirming district court's refusal to reopen the case under 60(b)(6) because plaintiff
had obtained a judgment for breach of contract); Harman v. Pauley, 678 F.2d 479, 481-82
(4th Cir. 1982) (affirming district court's refusal to reopen the case under 60(b)(6) because
the plaintiff had already filed a separate suit for breach of contract).
174. Sawka v. Healtheast, Inc., 989 F.2d 138, 140-41 (3rd Cir. 1993).
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relief, because the complaining party could simply fie a separate action for breach of contract based on the settlement agreement itself. 175
The proper resolution of this issue turns only on the interpretation and application of the "extraordinary circumstances" standard.
No serious obstacle of federal jurisdiction is posed, at least to the extent that the federal court is reopening the case to proceed on the
merits of the original claim. That claim was, presumably, within the
jurisdiction of the federal court when it was originally brought, and
the same jurisdictional basis should supply the authority for renewed
review of the claim.176 It thus seems that considerations of policy
should be the primary determinants of whether, as a general matter,
breach of a settlement agreement can constitute a sufficiently extraordinary circumstance to justify reinstating a case under Rule
60(b)(6).
As this issue involves settlement agreements, an important policy
to be considered is the policy favoring settlement. It appears that a
rule permitting reinstatement will advance that policy and the objectives that it serves. In most cases that are litigated in federal court, at
least one of the parties has a strong preference for the federal forum. 177 That party may be reluctant to jeopardize its ability to proceed in federal court by entering into a settlement agreement, which
could relegate any further enforcement proceedings to a contract action brought in state court.' 78 This reluctance would be particularly
175. Id.
176. See McCall-Bey, 777 F.2d at 1186-87 (stating that the district judge "undoubtedly"
has the power to restore a previously dismissed case to his docket under Rule 60(b), and
further explaining that, when "the judge sets aside his earlier judgment of dismissal and
restores the plaintiff's suit to the trial docket, and then proceeds to adjudicate the issues in
that suit, he is adjudicating issues of federal law, as he has unquestioned authority to do").
In Kokkonen itself, the Supreme Court indirectly made this point in distinguishing reinstatement of a case under Rule 60(b)(6) from direct enforcement of the settlement agreement: "Enforcement of the settlement agreement ... is more than just a continuation or
renewal of the dismissed suit, and hence requires its own basis for jurisdiction." 114 S. Ct.
at 1675-76.
177. This is certainly true of most of the cases that are in federal court on grounds of
diversity of citizenship or federal question jurisdiction, because at least one of the parties
either opted to file in federal court instead of state court or to remove the case to federal
court from state court. Indeed, the only exception to this general rule in either category of
cases would be those cases where the federal courts have been granted exclusive
jurisdiction.
178. Once the parties resolve their dispute by entering into a settlement agreement, the
federal court will lose its basis for jurisdiction in two situations: where jurisdiction was
originally based on the existence of a federal question; and where jurisdiction was originally based on diversity, and either the amount in controversy following the settlement is
no longer sufficiently high or the parties are no longer completely diverse. See supra notes
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strong where one party has doubts about whether the other party will
make a sincere and successful effort to perform its obligations under
the agreement. If, however, the federal courts treat breach of a settlement agreement as sufficient grounds for reopening a case under Rule
60(b)(6), then the risk of losing the federal forum will be greatly diminished and litigants will not be deterred from entering into settlements. By removing this deterrent, a rule that permits courts to
reopen cases pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) on the basis of breach of the
parties' settlement agreement will further the policy favoring the private settlement of disputes.
In addition, such a rule will serve another institutional interest of
the federal courts. If the courts were to employ the opposite rulerefusing to reinstate a case on grounds of breach of the settlement
agreement-a party would be able to divest the federal court of jurisdiction simply by settling the case. This consequence might encourage
a party to settle in bad faith, in an effort to force the case out of the
federal forum and into a state court.179 The Supreme Court's holding
in Kokkonen enhances a party's ability to achieve this result as it has
cut off the other avenue of redress-direct enforcement of the settlement agreement by the federal court. 180 Thus, a rule permitting the
federal courts to reopen a case because one of the parties has
breached a settlement agreement will serve the judiciary's institutional interest in maintaining the integrity of its jurisdiction because it
will prevent litigants from defeating federal jurisdiction through the
18
use of abusive settlement tactics. '
7-8 and accompanying text. In cases where, even after a settlement agreement is entered,
the parties meet the requirements for diversity jurisdiction, the court will, of course, have
an independent basis for jurisdiction and would have the power to enforce any settlement
agreement.
179. A number of the lower courts had expressed concern about such abusive settlement tactics in holding that federal courts have the inherent power to enforce a settlement
agreement. See Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368, 1371 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 862 (1976); Hamilton v. School Comm. of Boston, 725 F. Supp. 641,647 (D.Mass.
1989).
180. Kokkonen, 114 S.Ct. at 1677. Indeed, the Court emphasized that if a federal
court fails to retain jurisdiction over a settlement contract, "enforcement of the settlement
agreement is for state courts." Id.
181. In some circumstances, Rule 60(b)(3)-which allows a court to reopen a case on
grounds of fraud-will be adequate to address this concern about litigants entering into
settlement agreements in bad faith in order to divest the federal court of jurisdiction.
Fraud, however, is notoriously difficult to prove. In addition, Rule 60(b) strictly limits the
time in which a federal court may reopen a case based on fraud to one year after the order
of dismissal was entered. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) ("The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment,
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Both of these institutional interests-the policy favoring settlement and the protection of the jurisdiction of the federal courtsweigh in favor of allowing the district court to reopen a case for trial
on the merits if one of the parties has breached the settlement agreement which produced the dismissal. As there are no independent jurisdictional obstacles to such a ruling, the federal courts should hold
that breach of a settlement agreement can serve as the basis for reopening a case under Rule 60(b)(6). 82
This view comports with the position of the majority of the circuit
courts of appeals that had addressed the issue prior to the Supreme
Court's decisions in Kokkonen, Digital Equipment, and Bonner
Mall.183 However, the courts of appeals had been much more troubled by a related issue which still remains in some doubt even after
Kokkonen-once a case is reopened under Rule 60(b), does the disto enforce the terms of the original
trict court then have jurisdiction
184
agreement?
settlement
order, or proceeding was entered or taken."). In order to protect this interest fully, therefore, the federal courts need the more flexible provision in Rule 60(b)(6).
182. The courts should, of course, retain the discretion to find that, on the facts and
circumstances of a particular case, breach of the settlement agreement does not justify
reinstatement under Rule 60(b)(6). See, e.g., Stipelcovich v. Sand Dollar Marine, Inc., 805
F.2d 599, 605 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that reinstatement under Rule 60(b)(6) may not be
appropriate if plaintiff has already pursued a separate action for breach of contract);
Harman v. Pauley, 678 F.2d 479, 481-82 (4th Cir. 1982) (same). Thus, for example, if one
party seeks reinstatement because the other party has committed some minor breach of the
settlement agreement, a court might exercise its discretion to refuse to reopen the case. If,
on the other hand, the party seeking reinstatement shows that the other party has repudiated the settlement agreement, then it would seem that, in most situations, a court should
reopen the case.
Also, it should be noted that, under the Court's holding in Digital Equipment, if a
federal court does reinstate a case based on breach of the parties' settlement agreement,
the party who opposes reinstatement will not be entitled to appeal the ruling immediately,
but rather will have to wait until the trial has concluded. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop
Direct, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1992, 2004 (1994).
183. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
184. Compare Langley v. Jackson State Univ., 14 F.3d 1070, 1074 (5th Cir.) (holding
that the court does not have jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement even after
reopening the case under Rule 60(b)(6)), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 61 (1994), McCall-Bey v.
Franzen, 777 F.2d 1178, 1186-87 (7th Cir. 1985) (same) and Fairfax Countywide Citizens
Ass'n v. County of Fairfax, 571 F.2d 1299, 1303-05 (4th Cir.) (same), cert denied, 439 U.S.
1047 (1978) with Joy Mfg. Co. v. National Mine Serv. Co., 810 F.2d 1127, 1128-29 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (holding that the court has the power to enforce the settlement agreement after it
has reopened the case under Rule 60(b)(6)) and Aro, 531 F.2d at 1371-72 (same). See
generally Darryl R. Marsch, Note, PostdismissalEnforcement of Settlement Agreements in
Federal Court and the Problem of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 9 REv. LrNG. 249 (1990)
(describing the caselaw); Alyson M. Weiss, Note, FederalJurisdiction To Enforce a Settlement Agreement After Vacating a Dismissal Order Under Rule 60(b)(6), 10 CARDOZO L.
REv.2137 (1989) (same).
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Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Kokkonen, a number of
the courts of appeals had held that a district court does have jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement, as long as it has reopened the
case pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6).185 In reaching this conclusion, these
courts had relied on the established principle that federal courts have
the inherent power to enforce settlement agreements in cases pending
before them.186 In addition, one circuit had maintained that jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement derived from the fact that
the agreement grew out of the original federal litigation. 8 7
Other courts of appeals, however, had held that a district court

does not have jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement even after it has reopened the case pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6).

88

These

courts had rejected any notion that a federal court has "derivative jurisdiction" or "inherent power" over a breach of contract claim
merely because the contract served to settle a claim that was originally
litigated in federal court. 189 Moreover, they had refused to allow the
reinstatement of a case under Rule 60(b)(6) to confer jurisdiction.
The Seventh Circuit explained:
If the judge sets aside his earlier judgment of dismissal and restores
the plaintiff's suit to the trial docket, and then proceeds to adjudicate the issues in that suit, he is adjudicating issues of federal law, as
he has unquestioned authority to do. If instead he undertakes to
adjudicate issues of contract law that he does not have statutory
authority to adjudicate, because they are not issues of federal law or

185. Hinsdale v. Farmers Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 823 F.2d 993,996 (6th Cir. 1987). See
also Aro, 531 F.2d at 1371-72; Joy Mfg., 810 F.2d at 1128-29 (adopting Aro's reasoning, but
not discussing whether the court must first reopen the case under Rule 60(b)(6) in order to
enforce the settlement agreement).
186. Aro, 531 F.2d at 1371. It is widely agreed that federal courts have jurisdiction to
enforce a settlement agreement while the litigation is pending before them. See, e.g., Callie
v. Near, 829 F.2d 888, 890 (9th Cir. 1987); Dankese v. Defense Logistics Agency, 693 F.2d
13, 16 (1st Cir. 1982); Meetings & Expositions, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 490 F.2d 714,717 (2nd
Cir. 1974); Kukla v. National Distillers Prods. Co., 483 F.2d 619, 621 (6th Cir. 1973); Cia
Anon Venezolana de Navegacion v. Harris, 374 F.2d 33, 36 (5th Cir. 1967); Autera v.
Robinson, 419 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Cummins Diesel Michigan, Inc. v. The
Falcon, 305 F.2d 721, 723 (7th Cir. 1962). But see Londono v. City of Gainesville, 768 F.2d
1223, 1227 (11th Cir. 1985) (suggesting that, once the parties settle without the settlement
being incorporated into a consent decree, the district court must dismiss the case as moot
and may not enforce the settlement agreement). Londono was expressly disapproved in
Kent v. Baker, 815 F.2d 1395, 1399 (11th Cir. 1987).
187. See Aro, 531 F.2d at 1371.
188. See Langley, 14 F.3d at 1074; Adduono, 824 F.2d at 620; McCall-Bey, 777 F.2d at
1186-87; Fairfax Countywide, 571 F.2d at 1305-06.
189. McCall-Bey, 777 F.2d at 1187; Fairfax Countywide, 571 F.2d at 1304-05.
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state-law issues cognizable under the diversity jurisdiction, he cannot use Rule 60(b) to fill the vacuum. 190
On first impression, the Supreme Court's decision in Kokkonen
would seem to resolve this issue. In Kokkonen, the Court held that a
federal court does not have jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement after it has dismissed a case unless the court had retained jurisdiction over the settlement agreement in its dismissal order or
otherwise has some independent basis for jurisdiction. 191 In reaching
this conclusion, the Court explicitly distinguished the issue of reopening the merits of the original case under Rule 60(b)(6), observing: "It
must be emphasized that what respondent seeks in this case is enforcement of the settlement agreement, and not merely reopening of
the dismissed suit by reason of breach of the agreement that was the
basis for dismissal"' 92 The Court then reiterated the distinction: "Enforcement of the settlement agreement.., is more than just a continuation or renewal of the dismissed suit, and hence requires its own basis
for jurisdiction."'193
The Court's insistence that enforcement of a settlement agreement "requires its own basis for jurisdiction" suggests that a district
court also does not have jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement after the original case has been reopened under Rule
60(b)(6). 194 However, the Court's broad language on the power of the
federal courts to retain jurisdiction over settlement agreements casts
doubt on this conclusion. 195
In Kokkonen, the Supreme Court was careful to note that if a
federal court retains jurisdiction over the parties' settlement agreement in the order of dismissal, the court will then have jurisdiction to
enforce the agreement. 196 In emphasizing the existence of this power
to retain jurisdiction, the Supreme Court did not suggest any substan190. McCall-Bey, 777 F.2d at 1186-87.
191. Kokkonen, 114 S. Ct. at 1677. In Kokkonen, the party seeking enforcement of the
settlement agreement had not sought to have the case reopened under Rule 60(b)(6). See
Petitioner's Brief at 7 n.10, Kokkonen (No. 93-263); Respondent's Brief at 17, Kokkonen
(No. 93-263).
192. Kokkonen, 114 S. Ct. at 1675.
193. i& at 1675-76.
194. Id. at 1676.
195. See Krauth v. Executive Telecard, Ltd., No. 95 Civ. 0106, 1995 WL 272556, at *24
(S.D.N.Y. May 9, 1995) (explaining that the Supreme Court's holding in Kokkonen does
not squarely address the issue whether a district court may reopen a case under Rule 60(b)
and then proceed to enforce the parties' settlement agreement, but concluding that Kokkonen nonetheless seems to endorse an approach that requires the district court to have an
independent basis of jurisdiction in this situation as well).
196. Kokkonen, 114 S. Ct. at 1677.
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ive, policy-based limits on such power. 197 Further, the Court did not
question the long-standing principle that federal courts have the
power to enforce settlement agreements in cases pending before
them.198
It is thus arguable that the Court would find jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement to exist even if the district court did not
expressly retain jurisdiction in its order of dismissal, as long as the
case had been reopened and was again pending before the federal
court. Although use of a procedural device-reopening the case
under Rule 60(b)(6)-to evade the Court's jurisdictional holding in
Kokkonen seems formalistic, the logic of it follows from the Court's
technical treatment of the jurisdictional requirement in that case. In
Kokkonen, the Court made clear that a federal court can effectively
retain jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement by so stating in
its order of dismissal, and it has long been understood that a federal
court can enforce a settlement agreement before it dismisses the case.
Federal courts do, therefore, have the power to enforce settlement
agreements in these circumstances, even where there would be no independent basis for jurisdiction over the settlement agreement itself.
It would be plausible for the Court to extend this reasoning to conclude that even though a federal court cannot reach out and enforce a
settlement agreement when it no longer has any connection to the
case-having entirely and unconditionally dismissed it-a federal
court may proceed to enforce a settlement agreement after the court
has reestablished its connection to the case by reopening it pursuant
to Rule 60(b)(6). 199
197. The only limit that the Court placed on this power was that, if the dismissal is
pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(ii) (the terms of which do not authorize the district court to
attach conditions to the dismissal), the parties must agree to any retention of jurisdiction.

Id.; see also supra note 11 (describing Rule 41(a)) and notes 35-37 and accompanying text
(discussing the impact of this limitation).
198. See supra note 186 (citing cases). See also In re Mal de Mer Fisheries, Inc., 884 F.
Supp. 635, 637-38 (D. Mass. 1995) (holding that, under Kokkonen, a federal court has the
inherent power to enforce a settlement agreement in a case pending before it, because such
power is necessary to enable the court to vindicate its authority and manage its
proceedings).
199. At least one circuit court of appeals had taken this position prior to the decision in
Kokkonen. See Hinsdale v. Farmers Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 823 F.2d 993, 996 (6th Cir.

1987).
One court has recently suggested that when a court reopens a case under Rule
60(b)(6), the court should be considered to have voided the settlement agreement. In re
Hanks, 182 B.R. 930,935 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995) ("These [settlement] agreements become
enforceable only upon the dismissal of the underlying federal case. In the case sub judice,
an express condition to the effectiveness of the settlement between the Debtor and TMSI
was the dismissal of the Debtor's Chapter 7 case. In order for the agreement to be en-
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In Kokkonen, Digital Equipment, and Bonner Mall, the Court
made it clear that in analyzing this type of issue, the courts can and
should consider the policy-based, institutional interests that are implicated. From this perspective, however, the Court erred when it
largely ignored the policy favoring settlement in those cases because,
as discussed above, that policy also reflects substantial institutional interests of the courts. 200 The policy favoring settlement should thus be
given careful consideration, along with any other relevant institutional
interests, in the analysis of whether federal courts should be permitted
to enforce the parties' settlement agreement after reinstating the case
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6).
Permitting federal enforcement of settlement agreements would
promote the policy favoring settlement. If a federal court were willing
to reopen a case and then immediately enforce the parties' settlement
agreement, settlement would become a more attractive alternative for
parties. This is so because parties would expect that if they needed
help with interpretation or enforcement of their settlement agreement, they could return directly to the federal court, rather than being
forced to initiate a new lawsuit on the contract claims in a different
court.20 ' Because parties would anticipate that enforcement of their
rights under the terms of a settlement agreement would be efficient
and effective, they might be more inclined to settle. To the extent that
this greater inclination to settle would produce more settlement agreements (or settlement agreements earlier in the litigation process), the
goals that underlie the policy favoring settlement-conservation of judicial resources, reduction of backlog, reduction of expense to parties,
achievement of a more satisfactory resolution of the dispute-would
be advanced.
Implicit in this account of the increased incentives for parties to
settle, however, is a countervailing consideration that deserves mention. If it is easy for parties to return directly to the federal courts for
forceable, there can be no bankruptcy case."). In cases where the court reopens to consider the merits of the underlying claim, this understanding would certainly be correct. But
the issue here is different-whether the trial court has discretion to reopen the case simply
in order to enforce the terms of the original settlement agreement, without proceeding on
to consider the merits or setting the case for trial. The lower courts have assumed that such
action would not void the settlement agreement. The analysis in the text thus addresses
the various policy concerns that should guide the federal courts in resolving the issue
whether a district court has jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement once the case is
reopened under Rule 60(b).

200. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons why parties
might prefer to return to the federal court for enforcement of their settlement agreement).
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interpretation and enforcement of their settlement agreements, they
might be more inclined to seek help from the courts in solving any
problems that arise, rather than working out the problems between
themselves. This would, of course, add to the work of the courts,
thereby disserving the goals of conserving judicial resources and reducing backlog. Thus, while it seems likely that a rule permitting the
federal courts to reopen a case and then immediately enforce the parties' settlement agreement would have the overall effect of promoting
settlement, this countervailing consideration would diminish the beneficial effects to some degree.
In evaluating the desirability of such a rule, it is also important to
consider other institutional interests. In Kokkonen itself, the Supreme
Court stressed that the federal courts should remain aware of and
strictly abide by their jurisdictional limits.2° In doing so, the Court
was, of course, reiterating the mandate of the Constitution. But the
Court's easy rejection of the argument that the doctrine of ancillary
jurisdiction could support federal enforcement of settlement agreements, and its insistence that if jurisdiction is not retained in the dismissal order, "enforcement of the settlement agreement is for state
courts, unless there is some independent basis for federal jurisdiction," 203 suggest that the Court strictly construes the discretionary
doctrines that enable it to extend its jurisdiction. In other words, the
Court's opinion in Kokkonen indicates that it views the federal courts
as having an institutional interest in maintaining fairly tight limits on
the discretionary aspects of their jurisdiction so that they are available
to address matters properly within the traditional federal domain. This
interest would be impaired if jurisdiction were stretched beyond those
limits with matters that have traditionally belonged to the state courts,
such as contract claims. 204 This view points in the direction of not
202. Kokkonen, 114 S.Ct. at 1675.
203. Id.at 1677.
204. This view is also reflected in the Court's decisions on pendent jurisdiction. Under
the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, a federal court may exercise jurisdiction over state law
claims when the federal claims are substantial and the federal and state claims "derive
from a common nucleus of operative fact." United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. 715, 725 (1966). The Supreme Court has emphasized, however, that "if the federal
claims are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the
state claims should be dismissed as well." Id at 726. Cf.Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397,
404-05 (1970) (allowing federal courts to exercise their discretion in determining whether
to dismiss pendent state claims after the federal claims are dismissed). Congress recently
codified this principle in the "supplemental jurisdiction" statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)
("The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim ...[if]
the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction ....
"). See
generally 13B WiGHT- ET AL., supra note 21, § 3567.1, at 133-43 (discussing the application
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allowing the federal courts to reopen cases in order to enforce settlement agreements (which would involve contract claims traditionally
within the jurisdiction of the state courts).
The strength of this interest in maintaining strict limits on the discretionary aspects of the federal courts' jurisdiction, however, is left in
some doubt given the Court's dicta in Kokkonen. In that case, the
Court took pains to assure the federal courts that although they do
not have jurisdiction to enforce settlement agreements in cases that
they have unconditionally dismissed, they nonetheless have broad
power to retainjurisdiction over settlement agreements in their orders
of dismissal. 20 5 While in some cases it seems clearly appropriate for a
federal court to retain jurisdiction-typically by incorporating the
terms of the parties' settlement agreement into its own order and
thereby creating a consent decree 206 -the Supreme Court offered no
notguidance on when courts should undertake to retain jurisdiction,
'20 7
ing only that the decision is within "the court's discretion.
By providing the federal courts with this virtually unlimited ability to exercise jurisdiction over settlement agreements, the Court undermined the institutional interest that it apparently sought to protect
with its actual holding in the case. While the Court's actual jurisdictional holding in Kokkonen seems to be designed to limit the federal
courts, and to keep them focused on matters traditionally within the
federal domain, its dicta seems to give the federal courts wide latitude
to sidestep this jurisdictional limit and wander into areas traditionally
reserved for the state courts. In consequence, Kokkonen's dicta raises
questions about the strength of the Court's commitment to the interest in maintaining strict limits on the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
The issue of whether the federal courts should be permitted to
enforce a settlement agreement after reopening a case under Rule
60(b)(6) thus implicates competing policy considerations. On one
side, permitting such enforcement would likely promote settlement,
and therefore would further the interests that underlie the policy
favoring settlement. On the other side, however, permitting such enforcement would expand the federal courts' jurisdiction, and therefore
and general effect of the rule that pendent state claims should be dismissed if the federal
claims are dismissed before trial).
205. Kokkonen, 114 S. Ct. at 1677. This aspect of the Court's holding is discussed in
more detail, supra, at notes 29-37. and accompanying text.
206. See generally Kramer, supra note 10, at 324-31 (discussing the nature and benefi-

cial uses of consent decrees); Chayes, supra note 148, at 1288-1304 (discussing the need for
greater judicial involvement, including the use of consent decrees, in "public law" cases).
207. Kokkonen, 114 S. Ct. at 1677. See also supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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would undermine the interest in maintaining firm limits on jurisdiction. This conflict between institutional interests makes the resolution
of this issue difficult, because it requires a balancing of the relative
importance of competing interests. Empirical data on the effect of
permitting or refusing federal enforcement on the rate of settlement
(and on the cost to the courts of responding to enforcement requests)
would greatly aid the analysis, as it would help in evaluating the
weight that should be given to the interests that the policy favoring
208
settlement serves in this particular context.
Although federal enforcement of settlement agreements would
likely promote settlement to some degree, the costs to the courts of
providing enforcement might tend to marginalize any beneficial effects that the court would enjoy from the potentially higher settlement
rate. In this situation, the concern about maintaining strict limits on
the jurisdiction of the increasingly burdened federal courts would
seem to outweigh the benefits from the policy favoring settlement.
This resolution represents a judgment about the importance of the
competing interest in maintaining strict limits on jurisdiction. For the
reasons discussed above, that judgment is complicated by the dicta in
Kokkonen. Because that dicta is inconsistent with the central thrust of
the Court's holding, however, its reliability is dubious. 20 9 Thus,
although both competing interests are strong, unless empirical data
indicate that a refusal to enforce settlement agreements would significantly affect the willingness of parties to enter into them, the federal
courts should refuse to enforce settlement agreements even after reopening a case pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6).
B. The Ability of Parties To Dissolve Coercive Contempt Fines Through
Private Settlement Agreements

A careful analysis of the policy favoring settlement is also useful
in resolving another issue that has troubled both federal and state
208. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text (discussing the value of empirical
data).
209. The federal courts should thus act with caution in retaining jurisdiction over settlement agreements, despite this dicta. For the same reasons, the federal courts should also
exercise caution in enforcing settlement agreements in cases that are still pending before
them. Although the federal courts have consistently asserted their inherent power to enforce settlement agreements in pending litigation, the institutional interest in limiting the
extent of the federal courts' involvement in areas traditionally reserved for the state courts
is also present in this context, and it should serve as a check on the willingness of the
federal courts to enforce the terms of the parties' settlement agreement. This concern is, of
course, alleviated if the court would otherwise have an independent basis for jurisdictionsuch as diversity jurisdiction-over the settlement agreement.
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courts. That issue is whether the courts should defer to the parties'
request for vacatur of coercive contempt fines when the parties agree
to vacate such fines as part of their private settlement agreement.
In order to understand this issue, some background in the law of
contempt is helpful. Traditionally, the courts have divided contempts
210
into two general categories: criminal contempt and civil contempt.
The distinction between criminal and civil contempt turns not on the
nature of the contemnor's conduct, but rather on the purpose of the
sanction that the court imposes.21 1 If the sanction is remedial-for the
benefit of the injured party-then the contempt is civil. If, on the
other hand, the sanction is punitive-to vindicate the court's authority-then the contempt is criminal.212 While the courts have long adhered to this distinction, they have nonetheless consistently
recognized that any contempt sanction will usually contain both punitive and remedial aspects:
It is true that either form of [contempt sanction] has also an incidental effect. For if the case is civil and the punishment is purely remedial, there is also a vindication of the court's authority. On the
other hand, if the proceeding is for criminal contempt and the imprisonment is solely punitive, to vindicate the authority of the law,
the complainant may also derive some incidental benefit from the
fact that such punishment tends to prevent a repetition of the
disobediencem2 13

Within the general criminal and civil categories, the courts have
identified three specific types of contempts: criminal contempt, compensatory civil contempt, and coercive civil contempt. A contempt
sanction is "criminal" if it imposes punishment for past conduct-usu210. See, e.g., International Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 114 S. Ct.
2552, 2557-58 (1994) (describing the difference between civil contempt and criminal contempt); Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 631-32 (1988) (same); Gompers v. Bucks Stove &
Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441-42 (1911) (same). See generally Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Getting
Beyond the Civil/CriminalDistinction: A New Approach to the Regulation of IndirectContempts, 79 VA. L. Rnv. 1025, 1031-32 (1993) (describing the different types of contempt).
211. See Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. at 2557; Hicks, 485 U.S. at 631-32; Gompers, 221 U.S. at
441. Traditionally, the courts had looked exclusively to the purpose and form of the sanction in order to determine whether the contempt was criminal or civil in nature, an inquiry
that often posed difficulties. In Bagwell, the Supreme Court indicated that, in some circumstances, it is necessary for the courts to perform a more substantive review of the
content and effect of the contempt sanctions in order to determine whether the contempt
was criminal in nature. The determination that contempt sanctions are criminal, rather
than civil, has the important consequence of entitling the contemnor to full protection
under the criminal procedural provisions of the Constitution. 114 S. Ct. at 2562-63.
212. Hicks, 485 U.S. at 631; Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441.
213. Gompers, 221 U.S. at 443. See also Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. at 2557; Hicks, 485 U.S.
635-36.
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ally imprisonment or a fine in a fixed amount. 214 A contempt sanction
is "compensatory civil" if it is designed to compensate the other party
for losses sustained as a result of the contemnor's contumacious conduct.215 And a contempt sanction is "coercive civil" if it is a condi21 6
tional penalty designed to coerce compliance with the court's order.
The third form of contempt-coercive civil contempt-is considered to be civil in nature even though the contemnor may be imprisoned or fined, and any fines assessed are typically payable to the court
rather than the opposing party.217 This characterization has prevailed
because the penalty is specified in advance and is conditional, so that
the contemnor can avoid the penalty (whether imprisonment or a
fine) simply by complying with the court's order. In addition, the
sanction is viewed as remedial because its purpose is to compel the
218
contemnor to comply with the requirements of the court's order.
Sanctions imposed pursuant to a coercive contempt order can be
significant, amounting in some cases to millions of dollars. 219 In the
face of such fines, the parties in a number of cases have sought to
diminish or eliminate the fines through provisions in their settlement
agreements. 220 The question has thus arisen as to whether the courts
should honor provisions in private settlement agreements calling for
221
vacatur of fines imposed pursuant to a coercive contempt order.
214. See Hicks, 485 U.S. at 632-33.
215. See id
216. See id.; United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 303-04
(1947).
217. See Hicks, 485 U.S. at 632-33.
218. Id.
219. In the case that gave rise to the Supreme Court's recent decision in Bagwell, for
instance, the trial court levied over $64,000,000 in fines against the labor union pursuant to
a coercive contempt order. 114 S. Ct. at 2555-56. For a fuller discussion of Bagwell see,
infra, notes 234-254 and accompanying text.
220. See eg., United States v. Work Wear Corp., 602 F.2d 110, 114 (6th Cir. 1979);
Clark v. International Union, United Mine Workers of Am., 752 F. Supp. 1291, 1295 (W.D.
Va. 1990); Hawaii Pub. Employment Relations Bd. v. United Public Workers, Local 646,
667 P.2d 783, 797 (Haw. 1983); Labor Relations Comm'n v. Fall River Educators' Ass'n,
416 N.E.2d 1340, 1349 (Mass. 1981); International Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v.
Clinchfield Coal Co., 402 S.E.2d 899, 903-05 (Va. Ct. App. 1991), rev'd sub nom. Bagwell v.
International Union, United Mine Workers of Am., 423 S.E.2d 349 (Va. 1992), rev'd on
other grounds, 114 S. Ct. 2552 (1994).
221. In Gompers, the Supreme Court made clear that parties may settle away compensatory civil contempt fines, but may not affect criminal contempt sanctions. Upon learning
that the parties had settled the underlying litigation, the Court stated:
When the main case was settled, every proceeding which was dependent on it, or
a part of it, was also necessarily settled-of course without prejudice to the power
and right of the court to punish for contempt by proper proceedings .... If this
had been a separate and independent proceeding at law for criminal contempt, to
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A request for vacatur of coercive contempt fines gives rise to the
same two issues that were raised by a request for vacatur of a lower
court's opinion. The first issue is whether the court is required to vacate the fines on the ground that settlement of the action mooted the
case. The second issue is whether, as a matter of policy, the court
should vacate the fines in order to facilitate the parties' settlement.
With respect to mootness, most of the courts that have addressed
the issue have concluded that settlement of the underlying litigation
does not moot the coercive contempt fines imposed prior to the settlement. 222 In reaching that conclusion, these courts have emphasized
the negative impact that a finding of mootness would have on the
court's authority:
[T]he court's adoption of the [defendant's] mootness argument
would absolutely undermine the efficacy of civil contempt sanctions.
If the [defendant's] argument governed, any organization facing coercive contempt fines would know that it only had to postpone actual collection of the fines until the settlement of the underlying
dispute to avoid payment of the fines altogether. No decision of this
court will allow such unanswered contempt toward the rule of
law.223

vindicate the authority of the court, with the public on one side and the defendants on the other, it could not, in any way, have been affected by any settlement
which the parties to the equity cause made in their private litigation.
But, as we have shown, this was a proceeding in equity for civil contempt,
where the only remedial relief possible was a fine, payable to the complainant
.... [Wihen the main cause was terminated by a settlement of all differences
between the parties, the complainant did not require and was not entitled to any
compensation or relief of any other character. The present proceeding necessarily ended with the settlement of the main cause of which it is a part.
221 U.S. 418, 451-52 (1911). See also United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330
U.S. 258, 294 (1947) (stating that "[v]iolations of an order are punishable as criminal contempt even though the order is set aside on appeal or though the basic action has become
moot" (citation omitted)).
222. See Bagwell, 423 S.E.2d at 358; Clark, 752 F. Supp. at 1301; Hawaii Pub. Employment RelationsBd, 667 P.2d at 797. See also Work Wear, 602 F.2d at 114-16 (assuming that
settlement of the litigation did not moot the defendant's liability for coercive contempt
fines).
In the Bagwell case, the Virginia Court of Appeals had reached the opposite conclusion, holding that the trial court should have vacated the fines as moot. The court reasoned
that, when the litigation was settled, the coercive civil fines, which were imposed for the
benefit of the plaintiff companies, were also settled. With respect to the need to vindicate
the court's authority, the court of appeals opined that a court could achieve such vindication through criminal contempt proceedings against the defendant. See Clinchfield Coal,
402 S.E.2d at 905. The court of appeals' ruling was, of course, reversed on appeal by the
Virginia Supreme Court. Bagwell, 423 S.E.2d at 358.
223. Clark, 752 F. Supp. at 1301. See also Bagwell, 423 S.E.2d at 358 (agreeing with
Clark); HawaiiPub. Employment Relations Bd_, 667 P.2d at 797 (arguing that mootness of
the fine would defeat the coercive function of civil contempt sanctions).
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It is surely correct that the settlement of the underlying litigation
does not moot the coercive contempt sanctions incurred prior to the
settlement. As the Supreme Court stressed in Bonner Mall, even after
the merits of a case have become moot, courts have the authority "to
enter orders necessary and appropriate to the final disposition of a
suit ....

",224

Coercive contempt sanctions, while remedial in the

sense that they are designed to coerce compliance, are neither part of
the merits of the underlying litigation nor compensation to the plaintiff in the case. As a result, the court's ability to enforce the coercive
22
sanctions should survive the parties' settlement of the litigation. 5
On the issue of whether a court should, as a matter of policy,
vacate coercive contempt fines at the parties' request, the courts have
also emphasized the need to vindicate their authority. Both federal
and state courts have thus generally refused to exercise their discretion to vacate coercive fines, citing the need to maintain "the dignity
of the law and public respect for the judiciary..... ",226 In refusing to
224. Bonner Mall, 115 S. Ct. at 390.
225. This issue-whether preexisting coercive contempt sanctions are rendered moot
by the settlement of the underlying litigation-should be distinguished from the issue
whether a court may continue to subject the defendant to further coercive sanctions when
it is no longer necessary or possible for the defendant to comply with the court's order,
because the main case has been terminated through settlement or otherwise. With respect
to the latter issue, the courts have uniformly held that the coercive contempt sanctions
abate when the proceedings out of which the court's order arose are terminated. See, e.g.,
Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364,371-72 (1966); Backo v. Local 281, United Bhd. of
Carpenters and Joiners of Am., 438 F.2d 176, 182 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858
(1971); De Parcq v. United States Dist. Court for S.D. of Iowa, 235 F.2d 692, 700 (8th Cir.
1956); Harris v. Texas & Pacific Ry., 196 F.2d 88, 90 (7th Cir. 1952); United States v. International Union, United Mine Workers of Am., 190 F.2d 865, 873-74 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
226. Bagwell, 423 S.E.2d at 358. See also Clark, 752 F. Supp. at 1301 (noting that failure to enforce the fines would allow "contempt toward the rule of law"); In re Rogers Oil
Co., 17 B.R. 319, 321 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1982) ("To empower the officers of the estate to
compromise the fines would mean that the judicial power might always be upset or overturned by nonjudicial officers charged with administration of the estate."); Work Wear, 602
F.2d at 114 & n.12 (noting that the trial court had refused to reduce the coercive fines on
the ground that doing so "would denigrate the authority of the Court and sanction mere lip
service to its Orders"). Cf. In re Memorial Hosp. of Iowa County, Inc., 862 F.2d 1299,
1302-03 (7th Cir. 1988) (refusing to vacate a lower court's judgment finding the defendant
in contempt, and emphasizing that there is "a special interest when the adjudication in
question holds one of the parties in contempt of court. Such an adjudication may vindicate
not only an entitlement of a party-as the one in this case did-but also the authority of
the court.").
Several courts, however, have indicated that, in some instances, it is appropriate for
courts to exercise their discretion to reduce or vacate coercive contempt fines. See, e.g.,
Work Wear, 602 F.2d at 116 (assuming that courts have discretion to reduce coercive fines);
League of Voluntary Hosps. and Homes of N.Y. v. Local 1199, Drug and Hosp. Union, 490
F.2d 1398, 1405 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1973) (holding that a court has discretion to consider remittitur of coercive fines), vacated in part,1974 WL 1070 (D.C.N.Y., Apr. 16, 1974).
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vacate the fines, however, these courts have focused very narrowly on
their own institutional interest in maintaining the integrity of their orders, apparently giving no consideration to the competing interest in
facilitating the private settlement of disputes.
This issue does, however, directly implicate the policy favoring
the private settlement of disputes. A rule that allows parties to reduce
or eliminate coercive contempt sanctions in their settlement agreements will give both plaintiffs and defendants greater incentive to settle. A defendant-contemnor will obviously be more inclined to settle
because through settlement that party will be able to achieve not only
resolution of the underlying claim in the case, but also relief from oppressive contempt sanctions.227 Settlement will also be more attractive to the plaintiff because the plaintiff will be able to use reduction
or elimination of the contempt fines to gain greater leverage in settlement negotiations. 228
Such a rule, however, might have the effect of delaying settlement
and encouraging defendants to flout court orders in some cases. This
consequence might occur because defendants would know that they
could ultimately seek to negotiate their way out of any coercive contempt sanctions. This would erode some of the benefits of lightening
the court's case load that settlement generally brings about.
A rule that allows parties to vacate coercive contempt sanctions
in their settlement agreements thus would provide some positive incentives to settle, but it might also have a negative delaying effect on
settlement. In Bonner Mall, the Supreme Court was presented with a
similar dilemma: a rule that allows parties to vacate a judicial decision
in their settlement agreement would likely facilitate settlement, but
such a rule might deter parties from settling at an earlier stage in the
litigation when the savings to the judicial system are greatest. In the
face of these opposing factors, the Supreme Court simply dropped the
policy favoring settlement out of its analysis, stating: "We find it quite
impossible to assess the effect of our holding, either way, upon the
frequency or systemic value of settlement. '229
Although it may be tempting for the lower courts to take this
same approach to the issue of whether parties should have the power
227. In Bagwell, for instance, the parties' settlement agreement provided for the vacatur of $64 million in coercive contempt fines. 114 S. Ct. at 2556.
228. This point has been noted in the context of vacatur of judicial opinions. See Fisch,
Rewriting History, supra note 74, at 640-41; Resnik, Role of Adjudication,supra note 77, at
1490-91.
229. Bonner Mall, 115 S. Ct. at 393.
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to vacate coercive contempt sanctions, they should make a concerted
effort to examine the potential effect on the policy favoring settlement. Empirical research would greatly facilitate this effort, 230 but
even absent empirical findings, it is possible to look at general tendencies to determine the probable effect that allowing vacatur would have
on the policy.
In making that determination, the key question is whether a rule
allowing parties to vacate coercive contempt fines in their settlement
agreements would delay settlement and encourage defendants to disobey court orders, thereby nullifying the positive effect on the incentives for settlement that such a rule would provide. The concerns
about delay and disobedience, however, are somewhat mitigated by
several considerations. First, such conduct would put defendants at a
disadvantage in negotiation by increasing the other party's bargaining
leverage; indeed, the other party's leverage would steadily increase as
the coercive sanctions mounted. Further, delay and disobedience
would continue to carry risk for defendants, because they would have
no guarantee of successfully eliminating the coercive sanctions
through any settlement negotiations. Moreover, it is possible that,
even if any coercive contempt sanctions were vacated pursuant to the
parties' settlement agreement, the court could still punish the defendant-contemnor for criminal contempt.2 3 1 All of these factors should
discourage delay. In addition, the expectation that they could settle
away the coercive contempt sanctions might push parties to the bargaining table even sooner, in time to use the bargaining chip of the
contempt sanctions before it is too late-that is, before the defendant
has already served the prison sentence or paid the fine that the court
imposed. In light of these various considerations, it is likely that a rule
allowing parties to reduce or eliminate coercive contempt sanctions
would not significantly encourage delay and disobedience and thus
would, overall, tend to promote settlement.

230. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
231. See Yates v. United States, 355 U.S. 66, 74 (1957) ("The civil and criminal [contempt] sentences served distinct purposes, the one coercive, the other punitive and deterrent; that the same act may give rise to these distinct sanctions presents no double jeopardy
problem."); International Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 402
S.E.2d 899, 905 (Va. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that, when parties settle, coercive contempt
sanctions must be vacated as moot, but noting that vindication of the court's authority
"remains available by criminal contempt proceedings"), rev'd sub nom. Bagwell v. International Union, United Mine Workers of Am., 423 S.E.2d 349 (Va. 1992), rev'd on other
grounds, 114 S. Ct. 2552 (1994).
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Such a rule, however, would run up against other important institutional interests of the courts. Most significantly, giving the parties
discretion to dissolve the coercive contempt sanctions that the court
had imposed would jeopardize the integrity of the court's orders. If
the threat of sanctions that backs a court order can be disposed of at
the will of the parties, then the order itself may lose much of its force.
This could have ramifications for the judiciary as an institution on two
levels. In cases involving injunctions, it could cause defendants to
defy the orders of the court more readily, despite the disincentives
described above. And, on a more general level, it could diminish respect for the courts, thereby undermining their authority not only with
respect to coercive contempt sanctions, but across the broad run of
cases. Both of these ramifications would undermine the courts' ability
to resolve future cases effectively and, more broadly, to serve the public as an authoritative and respected protector of societal values and
the rule of law.
These institutional concerns are of unusual importance, for they
go to the very heart of the judiciary's ability to function effectively.
Concerns about the judiciary's ability to function effectively were integral to the Supreme Court's decisions in Kokkonen, Digital Equipment, and Bonner Mall,23 2 and because of the strength and

significance of the particular concerns in this context, they should be
held to outweigh the positive effect that vacatur of coercive contempt
sanctions would have on the policy favoring settlement and the objectives that it serves. In order to safeguard their institutional interest in
vindicating their own authority, therefore, courts should refuse to defer to settlement-based requests for vacatur of coercive contempt
sanctions. 233
232. More specifically, in Kokkonen, the Court was concerned about maintaining strict
limits on the discretionary aspects of the jurisdiction of the federal courts in order to preserve their ability to address issues properly within the federal domain. Kokkonen, 114 S.
Ct. at 1676-77. In DigitalEquipment, the Court was concerned about safeguarding for the
courts the benefits of efficiency that result from application of the final judgment rule.
Digital Equip. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 114 S.Ct. 1992, 1996,2002 (1994). In Bonner Mall,
the Court was concerned about the value to the courts of maintaining orderly procedures
and preserving judicial precedents. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 115 S. Ct. 386, 392-93 (1994).
233. As discussed above, both federal and state courts have reached this same result in
cases that have presented the issue. See supra note 226 and accompanying text. Also, it is
worth noting that, in the wake of Bonner Mall, at least two courts have held that a district
court need not defer to the parties' request for vacatur of sanction orders, even when that
request is made pursuant to a settlement agreement. Keller v. Mobil Corp., 55 F.3d 94, 99
(2d Cir. 1995) ("[T]here is no question that despite the parties' agreement to ask for the
withdrawal of the sanction order as a condition to settlement, the district court had the
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Although this resolution is consistent with the holdings of most of
the courts that have addressed the issue, it is greatly complicated by

language in Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's concurring opinion in International Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell,23 4 a
case that was also decided in 1994. In Bagwell, the trial court had
entered an injunction that prohibited the defendant labor union from

engaging in various obstructionist activities at the plaintiff companies.235 After numerous violations of the injunction, the trial court
announced a coercive sanction: it would fine the labor union $100,000
for each future violent breach of the injunction and $20,000 for each

future nonviolent breach of the injunction. 236 Over the next several
months, the court levied more than $64,000,000 in fines against the
labor union pursuant to its coercive order, of which approximately
$52,000,000 was payable to the Commonwealth of Virginia and the
affected counties. 237 While the case was on appeal, the labor union
and the companies entered into a settlement agreement that not only
settled the labor dispute, but also called for the parties to make a joint
238
motion for vacatur of the contempt fines.
After the trial court refused to vacate the $52,000,000 in contempt fines payable to the Commonwealth and the counties, the Virginia Court of Appeals ordered it to do so.2 39 On appeal, however,

the Virginia Supreme Court reversed. It refused to allow the parties
to eliminate the contempt fines through their settlement agreement,
emphasizing that courts must maintain the power to enforce their contempt order "if the dignity of the law and public respect for the judicipower to preserve a sanction already imposed ... ."); Dunkin v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp.,
159 F.R.D. 554, 555 (D. Colo. 1995) ("The public generally, and particularly those members of the public who use civil litigation to resolve their disputes, have a stake in conserving judicial resources by protecting the litigation process against such abuse. The sanction
orders were intended not only to compensate defendants, but also to vindicate the public
interest.
").
234. 114 S. Ct. 2552 (1994).
235. Id. at 2555.
236. Id.
237. The court treated $12,000,000 of the fines as payable to the companies, presumably as compensation. See id. at 2556.
238. IL
239. International Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 402
S.E.2d 899, 905 (Va. Ct. App. 1991), rev'd sub nor. Bagwell v. International Union, United
Mine Workers of Am., 423 S.E.2d 349 (Va. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 114 S. Ct. 2552
(1994). The Court of Appeals stated: "civil contempt fines imposed during or as a part of
a civil proceeding between private parties are settled when the underlying litigation is settled by the parties and the court is without discretion to refuse to vacate such fines." Id.
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ary are to be maintained." 240 The Virginia Supreme Court also
rejected the union's argument that the contempt fines were in fact
criminal and could not be imposed constitutionally without the requisite procedural protections. 241
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
this latter issue-whether the contempt fines that the trial court had
assessed were criminal in nature, even though the fines were imposed
in the traditional coercive civil form. 42 Ultimately, the Court unanimously held that the contempt fines were criminal and could only be
imposed if the defendant received the procedural protections, such as
a jury trial, that the Constitution mandates. 243
Although the majority opinion in Bagwell mentioned the vacatur
issue only in describing the procedural history of the case, 244 Justice
Ginsburg, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, thought that the Virginia
Supreme Court's resolution of that issue was of considerable importance in determining whether the contempt sanctions were criminal or
civil. In her concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg argued that "the
Virginia courts' refusal to vacate the fines, despite the parties' settlement and joint motion.., is characteristic of criminal, not civil proceedings." 245 Justice Ginsburg was persuaded that the Virginia
240. Bagwell v. International Union, United Mine Workers' of Am., 423 S.E.2d 349,
358 (Va. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 114 S. Ct. 2552 (1994). Both the Virginia Supreme
Court and the Virginia Court of Appeals treated this issue as one of state law. Id.; Clinchfield Coal, 402 S.E.2d at 904.
241. Bagwell, 423 S.E.2d at 356-58.
242. See International Union, United Mine Workers' of Am. v. Bagwell, 113 S.Ct. 2439
(1993).
243. Bagwell, 114 S.Ct. at 2561-63. In explaining why the fines were criminal, the
Court cited a variety of factors:
The fines are not coercive day fines, or even suspended fines, but are more closely
analogous to fixed, determinate, retrospective criminal fines which petitioners
had no opportunity to purge once imposed ....
... The union's sanctionable conduct did not occur in the court's presence or
otherwise implicate the court's ability to maintain order and adjudicate the proceedings before it. Nor did the union's contumacy involve simple, affirmative
acts, such as the paradigmatic civil contempts examined in Gompers. Instead, the
Virginia trial court levied contempt fines for widespread, ongoing, out-of-court
violations of a complex injunction. In so doing, the court effectively policed petitioners' compliance with an entire code of conduct that the court itself had imposed. The union's contumacy lasted many months and spanned a substantial
portion of the State. The fines assessed were serious, totaling over $52,000,000.
Under such circumstances, disinterested factfinding and even-handed adjudication were essential, and petitioners were entitled to a criminal jury trial.
Id at 2562.
244. Id. at 2556.
245. Id. at 2567 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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Supreme Court's rationale for collecting the fines-that courts "'must
have the authority to enforce their orders by employing coercive, civil
sanctions if the dignity of the law and public respect for the judiciary
are to be maintained' "-reflected purposes characteristic of criminal
contempt.24 Further, she found it "implausible" that the contempt
sanction was for the benefit of the civil complainant, as the complainant had repudiated the fines; indeed, the Commonwealth was pursuing "the fines on its own account, not as the agent of a private party,
and without tying the exactions exclusively to a claim for compensation." 24 7 Justice Ginsburg thus concluded: "If, as the trial court declared, the proceedings were indeed civil from the outset, then the
court should have granted the parties' motions to vacate the fines." 248
Under Justice Ginsburg's approach, a court's refusal to grant the
parties' motion for vacatur of a sanction imposed in the traditional
coercive form would necessarily make that sanction criminal in nature. This approach to distinguishing criminal from civil contempts has
potentially dramatic ramifications for contempt' law. As discussed
above, both federal and state courts have held, and will likely continue
to hold, that courts should not grant parties' settlement-based requests
for vacatur of coercive contempt sanctions. As these holdings harden
into a general rule, courts will universally refuse to grant the parties'
motion for vacatur of coercive contempt sanctions. Under the logic of
Justice Ginsburg's approach, this would mean that all such coercive
contempt sanctions are criminal in nature. This approach would thus
effectively relocate coercive contempt from the civil category, where it
has traditionally been lodged, into the criminal category.
Justice Ginsburg would apparently avoid this result by resolving
the vacatur issue differently. In her concurrence, she clearly indicated
that, in her view, courts should grant parties' requests for vacatur of
civil contempt fines. 249 This approach, obviously, would allow parties
to reduce or eliminate coercive contempt sanctions in their settlement
agreements. But the basis for Justice Ginsburg's position is unclear:
she provided no explanation, for instance, of why courts are obliged to
honor the parties' request for vacatur of contempt fines in a civil set-

246. Id. (quoting Bagwell, 423 S.E.2d at 358).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Justice Ginsburg stated: "If, as the trial court declared, the proceedings were indeed civil from the outset, then the court should have granted the parties' motions to vacate the fines." Id. at 2567.
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ting, when they are not obliged to honor the parties' request for vacatur of a judicial opinion in a civil case. s0
Justice Ginsburg's statements appear to have resulted from a narrow focus on the traditional distinction between the purposes of criminal and civil contempt. She emphasized this distinction, relying on the
Court's articulation of it during the early part of the century in the
Gompers case: "The civil contempt sanction, Gompers instructs, is
designed 'to coerce the defendant to do the thing required by the order for the benefit of the complainant,' ....The criminal contempt
sanction, by contrast is 'punitive, [imposed] to vindicate the authority
of the court.' "251 Using these classifications, Justice Ginsburg reasoned that once the private party-complainant no longer wishes to
benefit from the collection of coercive fines, the court's enforcement
of those fines cannot be said to benefit the complainant, and thus
would not be directed toward the traditional purpose of civil contempt.252 Further, Justice Ginsburg reasoned that the Virginia court's
emphasis on maintaining respect for the courts smacked of the tradi3
tional purpose of criminal contempt.25
A sound argument can be made, however, that the court's enforcement of the coercive sanction does benefit the private complainant, or at least private complainants in general. This benefit results
because the image of an authoritative court and the expectation of
certainty in enforcement will make coercive orders more forceful,
which in turn will give such orders greater coercive power. Justice
Ginsburg would likely contend that this more generous view of the
benefits of the contempt sanction blurs the distinction between the
traditional purposes of criminal and civil contempt. This blurring occurs because the benefit to the complainant that arguably justifies
treating the contempt as civil follows from the court's vindication of
its authority. Vindication of the court's authority, however, is the
traditional purpose of criminal contempt. Thus, the benefit to the
complainant (or complainants in general) is achieved through the very
thing-vindication of the court's authority-that serves as the core
purpose of criminal contempt.
250. See U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 115 S. Ct. 386,392-93
(1994). Justice Ginsburg, of course, joined the Court's unanimous opinion in Bonner Mall.

Id. at 388.
251. Bagwell, 114 S.Ct. at 2566 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Gompers v. Bucks
Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441-42 (1911)).
252. Id.at 2567.
253. I&
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While the argument that the court's enforcement of the coercive
sanction is of sufficient benefit to private complainants to justify treating the sanction as civil does tend to muddy the traditional distinction,
this consequence is not decisive. Indeed, the Court has consistently
recognized and accepted that there is significant overlap between the
purposes and effects of criminal and civil contempt sanctions. 254 Thus,
despite the indications to the contrary in Justice Ginsburg's Bagwell
concurrence, the lower courts should continue to refuse to permit parties to reduce or eliminate coercive contempt sanctions in their settlement agreements, and they may do so without any significant danger
that such a refusal will convert a traditionally civil contempt into a
criminal contempt.

Conclusion
The Supreme Court's three recent settlement decisions-Kokkonen, Digital Equipment, and Bonner Mall-offer rare insights into
the Court's views about settlement agreements. These cases suggest
that the Court has, perhaps inadvertently, strayed from its long-standing commitment to the public policy favoring the private settlement of
disputes. Indeed, in each of the three cases, the Court's concern about
protecting other institutional interests virtually eclipsed any concern
about the policy favoring settlement.
On reconsideration of the policy, however, it seems clear that the
goals that form its foundation are essentially institutional in nature
and, moreover, are of substantial importance to the judicial system.
Despite the contrary indications in this recent trilogy of Supreme
Court cases, therefore, courts should give careful and serious consideration to the policy favoring settlement in deciding cases involving
settlement issues. In attempting to illustrate how courts should incorporate the policy favoring settlement in their analysis, this Article has
considered two such issues that are currently troubling the lower
courts. With respect to the first issue-whether a breach of the parties' settlement agreement can serve as the basis for reopening a case
under Rule 60(b)(6)-the Article concluded that the policy favoring
settlement, in conjunction with the interest in protecting the jurisdiction of the federal courts, justifies permitting the federal courts to reopen a case for consideration of the merits of the original claim, but it
254. Even in Gompers, where it articulated the distinction, the Court acknowledged

that any contempt sanction will contain remedial and punitive aspects. 221 U.S. at 443.
See also supra note 213 and accompanying text (discussing the incidental effects of a contempt sanction).
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does not justify permitting the courts to reopen a case simply to enforce the settlement agreement. In regard to the second issuewhether a court should defer to the parties' settlement-based request
for vacatur of coercive contempt sanctions-the Article concluded
that, although permitting vacatur would advance the underlying objectives of the policy favoring settlement, courts should nevertheless
deny vacatur because of the strength of the countervailing interest in
protecting the integrity of court orders. In discussing the issues, the
Article has suggested an approach to resolving settlement issues that
gives the policy substantial but not decisive weight in recognition of
the important purposes which the policy serves.

